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Abstract 
Gender equality in education and female labor force participation is an important 
development agenda for sustainable economic growth in developing countries as well as 
for women’s empowerment and their well-being. Bangladesh, a country that used to have 
severe gender disparity in education, has achieved the substantial improvement in female 
schooling for the last few decades. Meanwhile, the country has experienced fairly rapid 
economic development thanks to rapid industrialization since the 1980s. In spite of the 
great achievement in gender equality in education and economic development, however, 
female labor force participation (FLFP) in the country has been behind compared to other 
countries in Asia over years. 
Assuming that increased women’s education affects various life-time outcomes 
beyond the formal labor market, the first analytical chapter (Chapter 3) examines the 
impact of female schooling not only on FLFP but also on gains from marriage and 
household welfare. Adopting a quasi-experimental design and using the nationwide 
female secondary school stipend program in 1994, as an instrument variable, I find 
statistically significant negative causal impact of women’s education on FLFP. In contrast, 
there are positive and significant effects of wife’s education on husband’s schooling, 
household income particularly from non-farm activities, and husband’s foreign migration. 
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My results suggest that an extra year of wife’s schooling increases husband’s schooling 
by 1.0 year and per capita household income by 18 percent. This chapter also investigates 
the causal effect on other household welfare variables and finds that wife’s years of 
schooling has positive and significant impact on sanitary control and children’s health.  
Using the household panel data in 2000-2014 containing unique time allocation 
data, the second set of analyses (Chapter 4) intends to identify the long-term changes in 
factors associated with women’s decision regarding their labor supply. Employing the 
Double-hurdle model, I separately examine women’s decision on participation in and 
hours spent on four different types of work: farm, non-farm, unpaid, and paid work. As 
for the participation, I find that non-farm/paid work is positively associated with women’s 
education, whereas farm/unpaid work is negatively correlated with female schooling. My 
findings also show that the positive relationship between non-farm/paid work has 
diminished over years. As for time allocation, however, I find very different results from 
the participation decision. First, there is no relationship between women’s education and 
time spent on farm/unpaid work, conditional on participation. Second, hours spent on 
paid work, conditional on participation, is negatively correlated with women’s 
educational attainment. The result partially reflects educated women’s occupational 
preference, which requires relatively short working hours and high wage. 
iii 
 
Acknowledgements 
My first and foremost appreciation goes to my main advisor, Professor Keijiro Otsuka, 
who offered continuous guidance, support, and encouragement toward the completion of 
my research and dissertation. His research philosophy, in addition to sincere attitude and 
strong passion toward development economics, has been and will be always my research 
principle. I also thank my advisors, Professor Chikako Yamauchi and Professor Jonna 
Estudillo, and an external evaluator, Professor Kazushi Takahashi, for providing 
insightful comments and constructive advice on my research.  
 My deep appreciation extends to all the faculty members, students, and 
administrative persons, who supported the GRIPS Global Governance Program (G-cube). 
I particularly thank Professor Tetsushi Sonobe, a father of G-cube family, Professor Yoko 
Kijima, and Professor Yusuke Takagi for their commitment and dedication to the program. 
As a part of G-cube family, I was fortunate to have great batch mates, from whom I 
learned many things through daily interactions and discussions. Although spending less 
time with, I also had many good memories with the second and third batch students. For 
their countless supports, I also thank G-cube admin team.  
 Lastly, I would like to express my appreciation to the late Dr. Mohabub Hossain 
and his dedicated team in the BRAC and Socioconsult, who collected the long-term 
iv 
 
household panel data sets in Bangladesh. My research benefited from the availability of 
the data. I also thank to the enumerators at Socioconsult for helping us organize field 
visits and informal interviews. 
v 
 
Table of Contents 
Page 
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………….. i 
Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………..………... iii 
Table of Contents…………………………………………………………….…………. v 
List of Tables…………………………………………………………………..………. vii 
List of Figures…………………………………………………………….………….… ix 
List of Annex……………………………………………………………….…………... ix 
CHAPTER 1: Introduction……………………………………………………………… 1 
1.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………….… 1 
1.2 Objectives…………………………………………………………………………… 6 
1.3 Organization of the dissertation…………………………………………………....... 8 
CHAPTER 2: Data Source……………………………………………………………… 9 
2.1 Data…………………………………………………………………………………. 9 
2.2 Attrition……………………………………………………………………………. 11 
CHAPTER 3: Increasing Female Education, Stagnating Female Labor Force Participation, 
and Gains from Marriage: The Case of Rural Bangladesh…………………………...… 14 
3.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………... 14 
3.2 Gender disparity in schooling and the female secondary school stipend program in 
Bangladesh…………………………………………………………………………….. 19 
3.3 Data………………………………………………………………………………... 25 
3.4 Estimation strategy………………………………………………………………… 26 
3.5 Results……………………………………………………………………………... 32 
3.6 Conclusions………………………………………………………………………... 48 
CHAPTER 4: Long-term Changes in Female Schooling and “Labor Force” Participation: 
Evidence from Rural Bangladesh……………………………………………………… 52 
4.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………... 52 
4.2 Background………………………………………………………………………... 56 
4.3 Data………………………………………………………………………………... 60 
4.4 Hypothesis and descriptive statistics………………………………………………. 63 
4.5 Analysis on women’s labor supply decision………………………………………. 68 
4.6 Conclusions and policy implications………………………………………………. 76 
CHAPTER 5: Conclusions and Policy Implications…………………………………… 80 
vi 
 
References………………………………………………………………………........... 85 
Tables………………………………………………………………………………… 103 
Figures……………………………………………………………………………….. 128 
Annex………………………………………………………………………………… 141 
vii 
 
List of Tables 
Page 
Table 2.1 Composition of Sample Households in Each Survey Year…………………. 103 
Table 2.2 Determinants of Attrition: Sample Women Aged 25-60…………………… 104 
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics of Selected Variables………………………………….. 105 
Table 3.2 Eligibility of Cohort for the Female Secondary Stipend Program………….. 106 
Table 3.3 The Impact of the Female Secondary Stipend Program on Wife’s Years of 
Education: Results of First-stage Regression………………………………………… 107 
Table 3.4 The Disaggregate Impact of the Female Secondary Stipend Program on Wife’s 
Years of Education…………………………………………………………………… 108 
Table 3.5 The Impact of Wife’s Years of Education on Marriage Age and FLFP: Results 
of Second-stage Regression…………………………………………………………... 109 
Table 3.6 The Impact of Wife’s Years of Education on Husband’s Education and Per 
Capita Household Income: Results of Second-stage Regression……………………... 110 
Table 3.7 The Impact of Wife’s Years of Education on Husband’s Migration, 
Electrification, and Assortative Mating: Results of Second-stage Regression……….. 111 
Table 3.8 The Impact of Wife’s Years of Education on Fertility, Children’s Schooling, 
Sanitation Control, and Children’s Health: Results of Second-stage Regression…….. 112 
Table 3.9 The Impact of Wife’s Years of Education on Weekly Expenditure: Results of 
Second-stage Regression……………………………………………………………... 113 
Table 4.1 Summary Statistics of Selected Variables: Sample Women Aged 25-60…... 114 
Table 4.2 Summary Statistics of Work, Time Allocation, and Total Income for the Last 
Four Days: Sample Women Aged 25-60……………………………………………... 115 
Table 4.3 Summary Statistics of Work, Time Allocation, and Total Income for the Last 
Four Days by Education Group: Sample Women Aged 25-60………………………... 116 
Table 4.4 Distribution of Top 5 Farm Work for the Last Four Days: Sample Women Aged 
25-60 in 2000 and 2014……………………………………………………...……….. 117 
Table 4.5 Distribution of Top 5 Non-farm Work for the Last Four Days: Sample Women 
Aged 25-60 in 2000 and 2014……………………………………………...…………. 118 
Table 4.6 Factors Associated with the Characteristics of Women Engaged in Work in 
2000-2014 (Probit)…………………………………………………………………… 119 
Table 4.7 Factors Associated with Time on Different Work in 2000-2014 
(Truncated)…………………………………………………………………………… 121 
Appendix Table A3.1 The impact of the female secondary stipend program on husband’s 
years of education: results of first-stage regression…………………………………... 123 
viii 
 
Appendix Table A3.2 The impact of women’s years of schooling on FLFP: all 
women………………………………………………………………………………... 124 
Appendix Table A4.1 Summary Statistics of Work, Time Allocation, and Total Income 
for the Last Four Days: Sample Men Aged 25-60…………………………………….. 125 
Appendix Table A4.2 Determinants of Women in Farm Occupation (Multinomial Probit) 
in 2000-2014…………………………………………………………………………. 126 
Appendix Table A4.3 Determinants of Women in Non-farm Occupation (Multinomial 
Probit) in 2000-2014…………………………………………………………………. 127 
 
 
ix 
 
List of Figures 
Page 
Figure 2.1 Map of Survey Sample Villages…………………………………………... 128 
Figure 3.1 School Enrollment Rate, by Gender and Age, in 1988, 2000, and 2014…... 129 
Figure 3.2 Years of Schooling, by Gender and Age, in 1988, 2000, and 2014……….. 130 
Figure 3.3 Average and Scatter Plots of Years of Education, by Age………………… 131 
Figure 3.4 Estimation Framework……………………………………………………. 132 
Figure 3.5 Density Check in Forcing Variable: McCrary (2008) Density Test and 
Discontinuity Check in Grade Repetition and Delayed Entry………………………… 133 
Figure 3.6 Discontinuity Check in Other Covariates: Pre-marital Household 
Characteristics in 2000……………………………………………………………….. 134 
Figure 4.1 Long-term Change in Income Per Capita and Its Composition in Bangladesh 
in 1973-2015…………………………………………………………………………. 135 
Figure 4.2 Relationship between Women’s Probability/Time Spending on Each Work and 
Years of Schooling: Sample Women Aged 25-60 in 2000-2014…………………..…. 136 
Figure 4.3 Relationship between Women’s Probability/Time Spending on Each Work and 
Years of Schooling: Sample Women Aged 25-60 in 2000-2014……………………... 137 
Appendix Figure A3.1 Bandwidth Selection: Cross-validation Function……….......... 138 
Appendix Figure A3.2 Discontinuity check in grade repetition and delayed entry….. 139 
Appendix Figure A3.3 Probability of attrition using the data in 2000………………….140 
 
 
List of Annex 
Page 
Annex 1. Supplementary Questionnaire on Individual Daily Activities for the Last for 
Days………………………………………………………………………………….. 141 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The importance of gender equality in education and labor force participation has been 
discussed in the UN Millennium Development Goals and the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals as one of the key objectives for countries to achieve equitable and 
sustainable development. The World Development Report (WDR) 2012 (World Bank, 
2012) has argued the potential benefits obtained from gender equality that are enhanced 
productivity, improved outcomes for the next generation, and more representative 
institutions, all of which would contribute to poverty reduction and inclusive economic 
growth. Thus, gender equality is no longer the issue only for women and their well-beings. 
Rather, it also matters for country’s development as a whole. 
 Bangladesh, a country that used to report severe gender disparity in education, 
has achieved the substantial improvement in female schooling for the last few decades, 
and women’s educational attainment at primary and secondary level has exceeded that of 
men in the recent years. According to the WDR 2012 (World Bank, 2012), there are four 
factors responsible for the rise in female education: 1) market return; 2) household 
income; 3) formal institution; and 4) informal institution. As for the market return, the 
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development of garment industry has greatly contributed to increase market return to 
female schooling as the sector has provided new employment opportunities for women 
who used to be out of the formal labor market in the country (Heath and Mobarak, 2015). 
According to the study, the export-oriented garment industry, which employs a workforce 
of 80% women, has increased young girls (5-9 years old) education and reduced the 
number of early marriage of teenage girls (12-18 years old). Household income would be 
another pushing factor in Bangladesh as the country’s income per capita has increased 
more than double since 1990 (World Development Indicator).  
The nation-wide secondary school stipend program in 1994, the formal 
institution, has also contributed to the country’s great achievement in the increase in girls’ 
education. The program has removed financial barrier to sending girls to a secondary 
school through the conditional cash transfer. Lastly, the change in norms about the value 
of girls’ education, the informal institution, has influenced the rise in female schooling. 
Successive political leaders, particularly the two women Prime Ministers of the 1990s, 
sent positive signals by taking close personal interest in primary education for girls. 
Moreover, a number of advocacy campaigns for girls’ education by international 
organizations, such as UNICEF, as well as NGO-led women’s credit groups have exposed 
people to new norms and ideas of the importance of girls’ education (Hossain, 2004). 
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In spite of the great achievement in gender equality in education and economic 
development, however, female labor force participation (FLFP) in the country is still 
behind. FLFP participation in Bangladesh has increased from 23% in 1990 to 33% in 
2016. This is low compared to FLFP in developing countries in Asia and the Pacific and 
the trend is quite different. FLFP in Asia-Pacific declined from 57.2% in 1990 to 50.3% 
in 2017 (the only region in the world with a declining FLFP) (Key Indicators for Asia and 
the Pacific). There are also large cross-regional differences in the FLFP rate. East Asia 
and Pacific region marks the highest rate with 64%, whereas only 26% and 35% of 
women participate in the labor market in the Middle East and North Africa and South 
Asia, respectively (World Bank, 2012). The WDR (World Bank, 2012) has identified 
three factors that are responsible for the increase in FLFP around the world from 1988 to 
2009: 1) economic development; 2) rising women’s education; and 3) declining fertility.  
In the context of Bangladesh, the increase in per capita income and the rapid 
industrialization since the 1980s indicate that the country has experienced its economic 
development. As I argued above, female schooling years have dramatically increased 
over years. Lastly, the country has also achieved fertility decline, as the government of 
Bangladesh made family planning a national priority since the independence in 1971 
(Schurmann, 2009). According to the Gender Statistics from the World Bank, births per 
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woman have declined from 4.5 in 1990 to 2.1 in 2016, and meanwhile contraceptive 
prevalence or modern methods have increased from 31% in 1990 to 54% in 2014. 
Therefore, the country has met all three factors. 
One of the potential answers of the country’s low FLFP comes from the 
feminization U hypothesis (Boserup, 1970; Chaudhary and Verick, 2014; Gaddis and 
Klasen, 2014; Goldin, 1995; Mammen and Paxson, 2000; Schultz, 1990; Tam, 2011). 
According to the studies, FLFP rates shift along the U shape as a country develops. It 
declines when a country transforms from a poor agrarian economy with family-based 
farming to moderately developed economy with low-skilled wage employment. As 
women are often reluctant to be involved in manual labor jobs in agriculture, construction, 
manufacturing, and transportation (Boserup, 1970), which are associated with strong 
social stigma (Salway et al, 2003), women are likely to withdraw from the labor market 
at this stage. As development proceeds, however, FLFP increases again. Higher education 
of women and development of white-collar jobs are two important factors affecting rising 
FLFP (Goldin, 1995). 
Another reason would be due to the difference in time allocation pattern between 
women and men, particularly to housework. Indeed, in both developing countries and 
developed countries, women devote more time than men to housework and childcare 
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(World Bank, 2012). Although time-saving infrastructure, such as electricity and tube 
water would reduce women’s burden of these work, its accessibility is not yet universal 
in Bangladesh. For example, access to electricity in 2016 is 66% and 76% in rural and 
urban areas, respectively (World Development Indicator). Proportion of households with 
water on the premises in 76% in 2014, and that of households using electricity/natural gas 
as cooking fuel is only 21% in 2014 (Gender Statistics). As women are often responsible 
for domestic work, it would be another reason for the low FLFP in the country. 
 Given the context, there are as least two important questions to which empirical 
literature does not provide sufficient response. One is the question on channels through 
which the increase in female schooling has enhanced women’s well-beings in rural 
Bangladesh. An existing body of the literature has examined the impact of women’s 
education on several outcomes including market returns, such as FLFP and income, non-
market returns, such as children’s human capital and household welfare, and marriage 
returns, such as husband’s education and income, separately. There are, however, few 
studies in developing countries that have exploited more detailed picture of the impacts 
of the increase in female schooling on various life-time outcomes. Looking at the non-
markets returns and returns in the marriage market is particularly important in rural 
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Bangladesh, where marriage is universal and the majority of women choose to be 
housewives.  
 The second question is on factors associated with women’s labor supply. 
Previous studies on FLFP have reported both restrictions on women’s market work 
outside the home, such as income effect, social stigma, and purdah norms, and promoting 
factors, such as women’s high educational attainment and the development of non-farm 
sectors. These studies, however, have often relied on the rate of women’s labor force 
participation based on occupational data, which is likely to underestimate women’s actual 
market contribution in developing countries, such as Bangladesh, where women’s work 
is highly heterogeneous and often categorized as unpaid family labor. Disaggregating 
FLFP based on their work and using time allocation data is desired to examine the factors 
affecting FLFP in rural Bangladesh, as patterns of employment and nature of work among 
women in rural areas are different from their counterparts in urban areas. 
 
1.2 OBJECTIVES 
The overall objectives of this dissertation is to provide empirical evidence toward a better 
understanding on female schooling and women’s labor supply in rural Bangladesh. To 
this end, the thesis has two specific aims. The first aim is to examine the impact of 
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increased female schooling on various life-time outcomes related to women beyond the 
labor market in rural Bangladesh. To deal with the endogeneity of education, I adopt a 
quasi-experimental design using the nationwide female secondary school stipend 
program in Bangladesh as an external shock. The second aim is to exploit long-term 
changes in factors associated with women’s decision on labor participation and time 
allocation in rural Bangladesh. I use three rounds of a household panel data between 2000 
and 2014 to identify changes in elements correlated with women’s labor force 
participation over time. Following the previous attempts, my study also disaggregates 
women’s work into farm, non-farm, paid, and unpaid jobs and presents differences in 
effects among sectors.  
 The thesis contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, the study 
provides an additional evidence to the growing body of the literature evaluating the long-
term impact of the increased female schooling on both market and non-market outcomes. 
The significance of the study lies in its use of natural experiment to extract the causal 
effects of education. Examination of the long-term consequence of women’s educational 
attainment is expected as many developing countries are keen to invest in female 
schooling as a development policy mean. Second, this thesis contributes to add new 
insights of the factors related with women’s heterogeneous market work using detailed 
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time allocation data. The time allocation data enables the analysis to employ different 
definitions of women’s “work” in a setting of developing countries.  
 
1.3 ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
The dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I provide detailed information on 
the data sets used in my analysis. Chapter 3 titled, “Increasing Female Education, 
Stagnating Female Labor Force Participation, and Gains from Marriage: The Case of 
Rural Bangladesh,” examines the causal effects of the increase in female schooling on 
women’s various life-time outcomes. Chapter 4, titled “Long-term Changes in Female 
Schooling and “Labor Force” Participation: Evidence from Rural Bangladesh,” presents 
the findings of the analysis of long-term changes in determinants of women’s labor supply. 
Chapter 5 closes the thesis with conclusions and policy implications. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Data Source 
2.1 DATA 
The present study uses a household panel data set “Livelihood System of Rural 
Households Panel Data” in 1988-2014 collected by late Dr. Mahabub Hossain of the 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC). It covers 62 out of a total 64 
districts in the country and consists of 62 rural villages—i.e., one village represents each 
district. Locations of the villages are shown in Figure 2.1. A multi-stage random sampling 
method was adopted for sample selection of 62 villages for the benchmark survey in 1988 
(Nargis and Hossain, 2004; Hossain et al., 2009). Approximately 20 households in each 
village were randomly chosen as the original sample households, whereas the sample size 
has been expanded as the survey round proceeded.  
The repeated panel household survey was conducted in 2000-2001 by the 
International Rice Research Institute for a study on the impact of rice research on poverty 
reduction sponsored by the International Food Policy Research Institute. The same 
households were revisited again in 2004 and 2008 for poverty mapping in Bangladesh 
and for assessing the impact of the rise in food prices on rural livelihoods. The latest 
survey was conducted in 2014 in collaboration between BRAC and the National Graduate 
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Institute for Policy Studies. The panel data covers information from randomly selected 
1,240 households in 1988, 1,883 households in 2000, 1,927 households in 2004, 2,010 
households in 2008, and 2,846 households in 2014. The data contained household 
information (e.g., amount of owned land, use of fertilizer, and investments in family 
businesses), individual information (e.g., age, gender, education, and occupation), and 
village-level information (e.g., distance to district head quarter).  
 In addition to the basic information on each individual of the sample households, 
the data sets contain a particular module to record detailed description of individual daily 
activities. The data covers: 1) type of activities; 2) time spent on each activity; and 3) 
wage/income earned by each activity, of selected family members (head, spouse, and one 
member from each male and female member) for the last four days. The questionnaire 
provides various choices of activities reflecting the large heterogeneity in occupations in 
my sample villages, which covers from non-productive category, such as rest, to 
productive category, such as crop processing at home (see Annex 1 for the sample 
questionnaire). Based on the information on time and income, I also calculate hourly 
earnings in each activity. As the data in 1988 is available only parts of my sample villages 
(therefore the number of observation is small), I use the data in 2000, 2008, and 2014 for 
my analysis on women’s time allocation (Chapter 4). 
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One of the strengths of my data set is its coverage of temporary domestic and 
international migrants because active migration is one of the particular features in rural 
Bangladesh (Kikkawa and Otsuka, 2016). Since the initial survey round in 1988, the 
sample households have been asked whether they have family members who are 
temporally absent due to migration. The information of individual migrants covered by 
the data varies over survey rounds. For example, the data of migrants in 1988 only covers 
age, relationship with household head, and place and duration of migration. Further 
information such as education and purpose of migration (e.g. for work, for education) of 
migrants has been added since the survey in 2000. The information of gender of migrants, 
which is the most important information in my analyses, was missing until the survey in 
2004. Therefore, I have complete information of individual migrants only in 2008 and 
2014. Note that the time allocation data is only available for family members currently 
staying in the sample villages. 
 
2.2 ATTRITION 
As the panel data cover the period for nearly three decades, there are attritions in the 
sample households. Table 2.1 shows the number of sample households, attrited 
households, and newly added households. The newly added households are households 
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that were included into the sample in later rounds in order to replace attrited households 
and to expand the sample size as a whole (from approximately 20 households in each 
village in 1988 to 30 households in later years). Attrition rates are 19 %, 7 %, and 11 % 
in 1988-2000, 2000-2008, and 2008-2014, respectively. Split households are households 
that were split from the sample household in the previous survey round. For example, if 
one of the household members gets married and becomes independent from his/her natal 
household, then the newly established household will be counted as a split household. As 
the survey has only tracked the households in the sample villages, split households that 
left the sample village are no longer covered by the survey. 
 Table 2.2 presents the results of Probit estimation to identify differences in 
characteristics between attrited households and others. A dependent variable is an attrited 
dummy, which takes one if a household went missing in the following survey rounds. 
Compared to remaining households, attrited households tend to have a household head 
with secondary education and a head with no job. They also face capital constrains: the 
number of working-age male family members is smaller, and amount of both owned land 
and non-land assets is less among attrited households. However, neither education 
dummies nor FLFP dummy are correlated with the attrition status. For example, the 
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coefficient of FLFP is 0.195 but statistically insignificant. Therefore, I decided not to 
apply attrition weight in my analysis.1 
 
                                               
1 Another concern with the data set is missing individuals. The data set is paneled at household level, not 
individual level. If a woman in the sample households leaves her natal village between survey rounds due, 
for example, to marriage or resettlement, she is no longer covered by the data in the later rounds. Give such 
characteristics of the data sets, we cannot explore individual history by tracking the same person over years. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Increasing Female Education, Stagnating Female Labor Force Participation, and Gains 
from Marriage: The Case of Rural Bangladesh 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Gender equality in education has been globally acknowledged as an important goal for 
international development. One of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is to 
‘promote gender equality and empower women,’ and an ongoing effort to ‘achieve gender 
equality and empower all women and girls’ is encouraged in the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). Empowerment of women, particularly by promoting girls’ 
education and encouraging active female labor force participation (FLFP), has an 
importance more than its intrinsic value. The World Development Report (WDR) 2012 
(World Bank, 2012) argues that gender equality matters for sustainable development as 
well as in its own right. Since women now represent 40 % of the global labor force (World 
Bank, 2012), enhancing women’s productivity by improving their ability and 
opportunities in the labor market is indispensable for a country to achieve further 
development. Meanwhile, significant returns to women’s schooling are to be found in the 
household sector, where the schooling of women has important effects on the human 
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capital of future generations (World Bank, 1991; United Nations Development Program, 
1996). 
A number of existing studies claim that Bangladesh has achieved substantial 
gender equality in education for the last few decades (Asadullah and Chaudhury, 2009; 
United Nations, 2014; World Bank, 2012). The country has increased its school 
enrollment ratio among girls aged between 5 and 19 from 33% in 1991 to 56% in 2005 
(World Bank, 2012). It has also experienced a reversed gender gap in secondary education 
where girls are more likely to attend secondary school than boys (Asadullah and 
Chaudhury, 2009). In contrast to the country’s great achievement in gender equality in 
education, however, the FLFP rate in Bangladesh has moderately increased at slow pace2; 
4% in the 1974 Bangladesh Census, 8% in the 1984 Labor Force Survey, and 26% in the 
2010 Labor Force Survey (Brindges et al., 2011; Heintz et al., 2017).  
This puzzling situation of Bangladesh, in which the increase in female education 
has not been associated with an expansion of FLFP, is not unique. Indeed, existing studies 
on the impact of female education on FLFP have reported mixed results. De Paoli (2009) 
                                               
2 One of the reasons for the low FLFP is a nature of women’s work. As women in developing countries 
are often engaged in home-based production or self-employed activities, which are barely regarded as 
‘work,’ the official data tend to underreport their economic contribution (Heintz et al., 2017; Schultz, 1990). 
I overcome this issue by using the time allocation data in the later part of our analysis. 
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shows the positive relationship between women’s education and labor market 
participation in Ecuador, while no impact of female schooling on market activities is 
found in Uganda, Israel, and Kenya (Keats, 2016; Lavy and Zablotsky, 2015; Ozier, 2015). 
Klasen and Pieters (2015) observe that India has experienced the stagnation of FLFP (at 
18% since the 1980s) despite the fact that the country has achieved expansion of 
education and great improvement in gender equality in education.  
A question arises as to why women are keen to invest in high education despite 
their low expectation of entering the formal labor market. A potential answer is the 
marriage market (Goldin, 1997). Indeed, education has its significant value as an 
investment in marriage market (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001; Lafortune, 2013), and 
previous studies suggest the importance of marriage through which women’s education 
could enhance their well-being (Goldin, 1995; Klasen and Pieters, 2015; Lefgren and 
McIntyre, 2006). Empirically, Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Taubman (1994) and Behrman 
and Rosenzweig (2002) show that an extra year of female schooling increases the 
partner’s education by 0.3 year by using twin data to deal with the endogeneity of 
education. Lefgren and McIntyre (2006) find, using the quarter of birth as instrumental 
variables, that husband’s earning is increased by $4,000 with an additional year of wife’s 
schooling in the US. 
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Women’s educational attainment matters even after the marriage particularly for 
issues related to children such as fertility and children’s human capital. As for fertility, 
wife’s education is found to have strong negative effects on the number of births 
(Breierova and Duflo, 2004; Chicoine, 2012; Ozier 2015; Tequame and Tirivayi, 2015). 
Increase in female schooling also improves child health and child health investment 
(Breierova and Duflo, 2004; Keats, 2016; Güneş, 2015; Currie and Moretti, 2003). In 
addition to health, maternal education has significant and positive impact on child 
schooling (Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2002; Lam and Duryea, 1999; Duflo, 2012). In 
India, Behrman, Foster, Rosenzweig, and Vashishtha (1999) stress the importance of 
women’s education in the productivity of home teaching, where better-educated mothers 
are superior teachers at home. Therefore, investments in women’s human capital directly 
influence children’s schooling outcomes. 
Expanding the effect of women’s education beyond the labor market, this chapter 
aims to examine the impact of increased female schooling on various life-time outcomes 
related to women in rural Bangladesh. While existing studies have assessed the effects of 
women’s education on several life-time choices such as work, marriage, and issues related 
to children separately, my study is one of a few attempts to capture more detailed picture 
of women’s welfare by looking at the causal impact of female schooling on all three 
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factors. My study is particularly unique as it utilizes the rich information on different-
sourced household income (farm and non-farm), disaggregated household expenditure, 
and migration history of all household members. None of the existing studies on the effect 
of increased female education in Bangladesh has addressed the impact on those outcomes.  
To deal with the endogeneity of education, I adopt a quasi-experimental design 
using the nationwide female secondary school stipend program in Bangladesh as an 
external shock. My results show negative and significant causal impact of female 
education on FLFP among moderately educated women, which is consistent with the U-
shaped relationship between FLFP and women’s educational attainment. I also find that 
an additional year of wife’s schooling increases husband’s schooling by 1.0 year and 
household per capita income by 18%, indicating the positive gains from marriage by 
increased education of women. Moreover, the information on income from various 
sources allows me to identify that the increase in the household income is mainly derived 
from non-farm activities, while there is no positive causality between wife’s education 
and farm income. Wife’s education has a positive impact on the probability of having 
healthy children, the probability of using clean latrine in a household, and household 
expenditure on nutritious food and sanitation items, suggesting that improved knowledge 
on health and sanitation enhances children’s health status.  
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The rest of the chapter is composed as follows. In section two, I outline the 
female secondary stipend program in Bangladesh, which is used for a quasi-experimental 
design in my analyses. Section three describes the data used in this chapter. Empirical 
strategy and estimated results are presented in sections four and five, respectively. Section 
six is conclusion. 
 
3.2 GENDER DISPARITY IN SCHOOLING AND THE FEMALE SECONDARY 
SCHOOL STIPEND PROGRAM IN BANGLADESH 
The schooling system (grades 1-12) in Bangladesh is categorized into four different types 
of schools: grades 1-5 are called “primary;” grades 6-8, “junior secondary;” grades 9-10, 
“secondary;” and grades 11-12 “higher secondary.”3The academic year in primary and 
secondary schools begins in January and ends in December. Officially, the school starting 
age is 6, but, according to my data in 1988, 47% of children aged 8 in a primary school 
were either in grade 1 or still illiterate, meaning that delayed entry and grade repetition 
are common. 
 
                                               
3 Associated with the different levels of education, Bangladesh has four different terminal exams, starting 
at the primary level (Primary Education Completion Exam, PCSE), followed by junior secondary level 
(Junior School Certification, JSC), secondary level (Secondary School Certification, SSC), and higher 
secondary level (Higher Secondary Certification, HSC). 
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Gender Disparity in Schooling before the Stipend Program 
Low educational achievement among girls and women in Bangladesh has been 
recognized by international organizations and the Government of Bangladesh at least 
since the early 1990s. For example, the World Bank reports that literacy rate among 
women was only 22%, while that of the total population was 35% (World Bank, 1992). 
According to my data in 1988, there was clear gender disparity in both school enrollment 
rate and years of education prior to the introduction of the stipend program in 1994. Figure 
3.1 shows the ratio of girls and boys, by age group, who were enrolled in a school in 1988, 
2000, and 2014. In 1988, school enrollment rate of girls was lower than that of boys at all 
ages. The gap between girls and boys was particularly pronounced at secondary school 
ages (ages 11-15). Girls’ enrollment rate dropped from 70% to less than 40% from age 
11 to age 15, while that of boys changed from 80% to more than 50%. Figure 3.2 presents 
the years of schooling of women and men, by age group. Overall, women reported lower 
educational achievement than men at all ages. The years of schooling at ages 15-19 were 
3 years and 5 years for women and men, respectively. This 2-year gap in years of school 
achievement between women and men is even persistent among the population aged 
above 19 (2 years and 4 years for women and men, respectively). 
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The Female Secondary School Stipend Program 
In response to gender disparity at the secondary school level in Bangladesh, a nationwide 
female secondary school stipend program was implemented in 1994 with the aim of 
raising school enrollment among rural girls.4 Program objectives include (1) improving 
secondary school attainment among women and girls; (2) promoting female employment 
and labor force participation; and (3) reducing early marriage and avoiding early 
pregnancy. The program combines four uniform projects under different donors: Female 
Secondary School Project by the Government of Bangladesh (GOB), Female Secondary 
School Assistant Project by the World Bank and GOB, Secondary Education 
Development Project by the Asian Development Bank and GOB, and Female Secondary 
Education Project by the Norwegian Government. These four differently named projects 
share the same stipend scheme (including stipend amount and eligibility criteria) and the 
same project objectives, so that they can be regarded as a single uniform stipend program. 
As the program targets rural areas, 30 metropolitan thanas in Khulna, Dhaka, Chittagong, 
and Rajshahi were excluded (Schurmann, 2009). Thus, the project covered 460 out of all 
the 490 thanas in the country. The program was officially introduced in January 1994 in 
                                               
4In the same line with this program, a similar pilot project has been implemented in a narrow part of the 
country since 1982. Meanwhile, free tuition policy was introduced to grades 6-8 in 1990 in rural thanas. 
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all 460 thanas, and 98% of all rural secondary schools where girls enrolled were part of 
this program by 1998 (Khandker et al., 2003).5 
The targeted population of the female secondary school stipend program is girls 
in grades 6 to 10 (aged 11 to 15). All girls attending a secondary school in rural areas who 
meet the following criteria are eligible to receive stipend and tuition subsidy: (1) attend 
at least 75 % of school days; (2) attain at least 45% mark in the annual examination; and 
(3) remain unmarried. According to Khandker et al. (2003), only 6% of secondary school 
girls have failed to satisfy the criteria. The stipend covered as much as 50% of the costs 
of needed items such as textbooks, uniforms, and stationery, and other expenses such as 
transportation and exam fees (approximately 25-60 taka per month). Moreover, the 
program subsidizes full tuition cost, ranging from 10 to 20 taka per month, depending on 
a grade (Fuwa, 2001). The stipend was directly paid to an account in the girl’s name at 
the nearest Agrani Bank, a state bank with branches all over the country. 
In addition to the stipend and tuition subsidy, the program also offered technical 
assistance to improve the quality of schools such as curriculum reforms, instructional material 
development, teacher training, recruitment of female teachers, improvement of school 
infrastructure, community awareness programs, and institutional capacity building. Unlike the 
                                               
5Although official implementation of the program was in January 1994, there was a delay in some schools—
the program started in either 1995 or 1996 (Fuwa, 2001; Khandker et al., 2003). 
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stipend and tuition subsidy, however, these technical supports differed, depending on the donors 
(Fuwa, 2001). Although there are other potential barriers to sending girls to a secondary school, 
which were not covered by the program, such as accessibility to a school (which can be enhanced 
by constructing new secondary schools in a village or nearby village or providing decent 
transportation to get a school) and domestic work burden (which can be reduced by time-saving 
infrastructure such as electricity and tube water), the program has at least removed a financial 
barrier and also changed public awareness of the importance of girls’ secondary education. 
Immediate changes after the stipend program in school enrollment rate and years 
of schooling are observed from Figures 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. In 2000, school 
enrollment rate at primary school ages (ages 6-10) was nearly 90% for both girls and boys, 
and that of secondary school ages was higher among girls than boys. Girls at age 15 
reported 75% school enrollment rate, while boys at the same age reported less than 55%. 
Likewise, both girls and boys aged 10-14 mark on average 4 years of schooling in 2000; 
the achievement was slightly higher for girls than for boys at ages 15-19. In 2014, the gap 
in educational achievement between women and men completely disappeared among 
younger cohorts (ages 15-19, 20-24, and 25-29) who are likely to have benefited from the 
stipend program. 
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Several studies have already reported positive results of the female secondary 
school stipend program. Using data at the early stage of its implementation, Fuwa (2001) 
and Khandker et al. (2003) show that the immediate impact of the program is to raise 
school enrollment rate among targeted girls, while it has reduced that among boys. 
Reversed gender gap of secondary school enrollment rate between rural boys and girls 
has been also examined by Asadullah and Chaudhury (2009) using the difference-in-
difference (DID) methodology with both rural and urban data. They argue that rural boys 
at the secondary school have been disadvantaged partially due to the female-favored 
stipend program. Moreover, recent studies have examined long-term impacts of the 
program on women’s livelihood. Using a data set covering both rural and metropolitan 
areas, Hong and Sarr (2012) employed both DID and regression discontinuity 
methodologies and found that the program has contributed to raising women’s years of 
education by 1.6–2.0 years and increasing the marriage age of women by 1.4–2.3 years. 
They also provided evidence that an additional year of schooling led by the program has 
enhanced FLFP by 2.4–5.3%. Using data set covering both rural and metropolitan areas, 
Shamsuddin (2015) also employed DID and showed an increase in women’s years of 
education by 0.36–1.08 years and FLFP by 2.2–6.6 percentage points due to the program, 
while he reported a decrease in female earnings by 5.8–17.0 %. In addition to the positive 
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impact on education and labor force participation, the study argues that the program has 
enhanced women’s incentive to work in the service industry and engage in self-
employment. A recently published study by Hahn et al. (2018), using DID, also reported 
the similar positive impacts on women’s years of education, labor market outcomes, and 
marriage age. Moreover, their findings suggested that the stipend program has decreased 
fertility rates by 8%-12%. 
 
3.3 DATA 
The present chapter uses the latest round of a household panel data set “Livelihood 
System of Rural Households Panel Data” collected by Dr. Mahabub Hossain of the 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC). All the sample villages were under 
the targeted thanas of the female secondary school stipend program. The 2014 data 
covered 2,846 randomly selected households. Moreover, the data contained the complete 
information on migrant family members (e.g., age, gender, education, and occupation). 
 From the total of 2,846 households, I selected 2,565 households for this study in 
which both wife and husband were recorded. Households in which either wife or husband 
is missing due to divorce or death of the partner consisted of 9.8 % of the total. Table 3.1 
shows summary statistics for these selected couples. Columns (1)-(2) are for all 2,565 
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samples and columns (3)-(4) are for subsamples in which wife’s age is between 25 and 
36. This subsample was mainly used for my analyses. Details about the subsample will 
be explained in the next section. In column 3, the average age of the wife in the subsample 
was 30.7 years, while that of the husband was 38.2 years. Wives were slightly more 
educated than husbands; the former with 5.56 years of schooling and the latter, 5.40 years. 
In contrast, the average marriage age was substantially different; wives get married at the 
age of 17, while husbands get married at the age of 21. Only 9% of the women were in 
the labor force, implying that majority were housewives. Average household per capita 
income was 32,733 taka6, to which wife is less likely to contribute due to the low FLFP. 
 
3.4 ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the causal effects of women’s education on their 
various life-time outcomes. Unlike existing studies, however, my sample covered only 
rural areas where the female secondary school stipend program was actually implemented. 
Thus, the DID methodology, which uses sample from metropolitan areas as a comparison 
group, cannot be applied to the case under study. The OLS estimate is likely to be biased 
due to measurement errors and unobserved factors (such as individual “ability”), which 
                                               
6 1 USD = 77.6 Taka in 2014 (Global Economic Monitor, World Bank) 
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affect both educational attainment and outcomes of interest (Lefgren and McIntyre, 2006). 
Instead, I employed a fuzzy regression discontinuity design to explore the causal impact 
of women’s education on various outcomes. In my application, I utilized the timing of the 
introduction of the stipend program and divided my sample into ‘treatment,’ who were 
exposed to the stipend program, and ‘control,’ who did not benefit from the stipend 
program based on the year when the program was first implemented. As treatment status 
was assigned based on an observed forcing variable, age, I assumed that whether an 
individual is treated or not is completely random. 
Table 3.2 provides details about the eligibility for the stipend program of each 
birth cohort. To summarize, girls born before 1980 (women aged above 34 in 2014) were 
not covered by the program and girls born between 1980 and 1982 (women aged between 
31 and 34) were partially covered by the program because when the program was first 
introduced in 1994, the program entry grade is fixed with either grade 6 or 9. In other 
words, girls in grades 7 and 8 in 1994 and girls in grade 8 in 1995 were not covered by 
the program, as indicated by the non-highlighted parts in the table, as they had to wait 
until grade 9 to receive the program benefit. All girls who were born after 1983 (women 
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aged 30 or younger) fully benefited from the stipend program. Therefore, I set the age 
cutoff point at age 30 in 2014.7 
Note that my design is a fuzzy regression discontinuity, where treatment and 
control groups are classified based on the probability of being treated, instead of a sharp 
regression discontinuity, where treatment group is clearly differentiated form control 
group based on the actual treatment receipt, because some girls in the treatment group did 
not receive treatment (stipend). As the stipend program was available for girls who were 
actually attending a secondary school at the time of implementation (in other words, for 
compliers), those who were at the eligible age but chose not to proceed to secondary 
education did not benefit from the program (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). Moreover, 
some girls in the control group received treatment. As seen in Table 3.2, some of the 
1980-1982 cohorts received the stipend although they are categorized as the control 
cohorts.8 In addition to those cohorts, there are some girls in the control group who 
occasionally benefited from the stipend program due to grade repetition and delayed entry. 
I will further discuss this issue in the later section. 
                                               
7We also analyzed separate impacts of the stipend program on grades 6-8 and 9-10 in later analysis. 
8 In the later section, I examine the separate impacts of the stipend program in grade 6-8 and 9-10 to 
capture this partial effect. 
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 Figures 3.3(a) and 3.3(b) plot average years of education by each age group and 
fitted line for the plots for wives and husbands, respectively. A drawn vertical line 
indicates the age cutoff point at age 30. Not surprisingly, there was the sharp upward 
jump (discontinuity) for wives at the age cutoff point, which indicates the causal effect of 
the stipend program on the years of education for women near the cutoff. At the cutoff, 
women exposed to the stipend program attained on average nearly 1 additional year of 
schooling. However, such upward jump cannot be observed for husbands at the same age 
cutoff. Although there was large heterogeneity in the average years of education among 
husbands aged below 30 (left hand side of the cutoff), the fitted line indicates the decrease 
in education, which is consistent with findings from previous studies that the stipend 
program has led to reversed gender disparity in the secondary level of education (Fuwa, 
2001; Khandker et al., 2003; Asadullah and Chaudhury, 2009). Likewise, Figures 3.3(c) 
and 3.3(d) describe scatter plots of years of education, by age, with the bin size 3. Again, 
the sharp discontinuity at the cutoff was observed for wives but not for husbands. 
 Given the sharp discontinuity in wife’s years of education at the age cutoff point, 
I restricted the analysis to sample near the cutoff and applied the fuzzy regression 
discontinuity setting. This assumes that the age cohorts near the age cutoff point are 
similar in most characteristics, so that any difference in outcomes can be attributed to the 
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stipend program. Let Y be the outcome of interest; Educ, the educational attainment of 
women; x, the age; and c, the cutoff. Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008), the causal 
effect of an additional year of schooling in the fuzzy setting 𝜏 is defined as 
𝜏 =
lim𝑥→−𝑐 𝐸[𝑌|𝐴𝑔𝑒 = 𝑥] − lim𝑥→+𝑐 𝐸[𝑌|𝐴𝑔𝑒 = 𝑥]
lim𝑥→−𝑐 𝐸[𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐|𝐴𝑔𝑒 = 𝑥] − lim𝑥→+𝑐 𝐸[𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐|𝐴𝑔𝑒 = 𝑥]
 ,    (1) 
where the limits from the left and right are taken for the range 𝑐 − ℎ < 𝑥 < 𝑐 + ℎ with 
some bandwidths h. As suggested by Hahn et al. (2001), the treatment effect in this setting 
should be estimated by two-stage least-squares (2SLS): 
𝑌𝑗𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖̂ + 𝑓(𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 − 𝑐) + 𝑋𝑠𝛿𝑌 + 𝑣𝑖  ,     (2) 
𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 = 𝛾 + 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × (𝜋 + 𝑔(𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 − 𝑐)) + 𝑔(𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 − 𝑐) + 𝑋𝑠𝛿𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐 + 𝜖𝑖 ,   (3) 
where 𝑌𝑗𝑠 represents the outcome of interest of a household j in village s. 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 is years 
of education of wife i in a household j in village s; 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 is the age of wife; and village 
dummies 𝑋𝑠 are also included to capture difference in the characteristics of the marriage 
market in each village. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 = 1[𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 ≤ 30], and 𝑓(∙) and 𝑔(∙) are some functions 
of the order of polynomials. Here, I employed the first order polynomial as none of the 
higher order of polynomials was significant. The interaction term between 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 and 
𝑔(∙) was included to allow the regression function to differ on both sides of the cutoff 
point (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Moreover, 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 − 𝑐 instead of 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 was used to allow 
the intercepts of the two regressions to be different at both sides of the cutoff. 𝑣𝑖  and 𝜖𝑖 
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are random error terms. Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Lee and Lemieux 
(2010), standard errors were computed using the robust 2SLS standard errors and 
clustered at cohort (age) level. In this framework, 𝛽 represents the causal effect of an 
additional year of wife’s education on outcomes. The treatment effect is a local average 
treatment effect. 
 To select optimal bandwidths, ℎ, I used the cross-validation methods (Imbens 
and Lemieux, 2008) and several bandwidth selection procedures by Calonico et al. (2014, 
2017). Appendix Figure A3.1 shows the results of the cross-validation procedure. The 
cross-validation function sharply declined once I included 3 age cohorts from left-hand 
and right-hand sides of the cutoff, and it increased rapidly after including 6 age cohorts 
from each side. Meanwhile, estimated bandwidths by several procedures varied from 2 to 
7 and from 2 to 15 for left-hand and right-hand side of the cutoff, respectively. Based on 
these results, I employed the bandwidths with 3 to 6 in my analysis. The order of the 
polynomials and the bandwidth were the same at both first and second stages. 
Figure 3.4 shows the estimation framework of this study. I assumed that both 
market and non-market activities within a household are determined directly by wife’s 
education and indirectly by husband’s education, which is affected by wife’s education 
due to assortative mating. Solid lines indicate the causal relationships between wife’s 
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education and outcomes: husband’s education, market activities, and non-market 
activities, which are examined in this study. I also assumed that, although the similar 
causal relationships between husband’s education and market and non-market activities 
may exist, which is shown by dotted lines, they are not explicitly explored in this study. 
In each regression, I excluded husband’s education due to the strong correlation between 
wife’s and husband’s schooling levels. Among various outcomes shown in this figure, I 
assumed that husband’s education, occupation, and household income represent 
pecuniary gains from marriage, while fertility, sanitation control, children’s health and 
education represent non-pecuniary household welfare gains. 
 
3.5 RESULTS 
Internal validity test 
Before moving to my main results, I present three standard validity checks following 
Imbens and Lemieux (2008). First, as was discussed in the previous section, I argue that 
treatment status is randomly assigned as it is determined based on individual age. An 
important assumption here is that any individual cannot manipulate the treatment status 
so that I can use the stipend program as a natural experiment, which solely affects female 
school attainment. To ensure this assumption, I examine whether there is any 
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discontinuity in the forcing variable, age, at the cutoff by using McCrary density test 
(McCrary, 2008). Figures 3.5(a) and 3.5(b) show the results of the test for the sample in 
2000 and 2014, respectively. Neither figure reveals any discontinuity around the cutoff.  
 There is, however, still a possibility of manipulation of the treatment status. For 
example, if parents of girls, whose age was not eligible for the treatment, anticipated the 
stipend program, they would intentionally delay daughter’s school entry year or have 
grade repetition to enable daughters to remain in an eligible grade when the stipend 
program was introduced. Unfortunately, there is no clear record when the stipend program 
was officially announced to the entire country; therefore, I cannot reject the possibility of 
intentional delayed entry or grade repetition among girls around the cutoff. As I discussed 
in the previous section, delayed entry and grade repetition are common in the sample, but 
if they are systematically correlated with the timing of the stipend program, the 
assignment of the treatment status is no longer random. To check whether there is any 
discontinuity in probability of delayed entry and grade repetition, I create a dummy 
variable that takes one if a schooling child is in a lower grade than the grade she/he is 
supposed to be according to her/his age. Figure 3.5(c) presents the result. Although there 
is a slight jump between age 15 and 16 at the cutoff, this may be because of the terminal 
exam after grade 10 (at ages 15-16) called Secondary School Certification (SSC). As an 
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individual who fails to pass the exam cannot proceed to the next grade, a number of grade 
repeaters are likely to increase at this age. In fact, another jump is observed at around age 
18 when students face another terminal exam called Higher Secondary Certification 
(HSC).  
To check that the jump in grade repetition and delayed entry occurs similarly in 
the other waves of the data, I also create the same figures using the data in 2008 and 2014. 
The data in 1988 was not used because social awareness of the importance of girls’ 
education as well as demand of female education (such as demand of having a school 
certification) have been dramatically changed since the introduction of the stipend 
program (Schurmann, 2009). The results in 2008 and 2014 are shown in Appendix 
Figures A3.2(a) and (b), respectively. In both years, there is a clear jump around the same 
cutoff age 16, which is quite similar with the result using the data in 2000. Thus, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the observed jump is less likely to be motivated by the stipend 
program. Rather, it is more likely to be derived from the terminal exam between the 
grades. 
 Second, to ensure that outcomes of interest are solely affected by the change in 
female schooling derived from the stipend program, I examine whether covariates that 
affect both the educational attainment and outcomes of interest show discontinuity at the 
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cutoff. Figures 3.6(a)-3.6(d) present pre-marital household characteristics of children in 
2000: mother’s years of schooling, father’s years of schooling, amount of owned land, 
and log of non-land fixed asset, which could affect both women’s schooling and their 
post-marital outcomes. Note that my data are not individually paneled, rather it is paneled 
at the household level. Therefore, I cannot track pre-marital household characteristics of 
exactly my study sample women in 2014. Instead, I use my data of children in 2000, 
assuming that they share similar trend in household characteristics with the study sample 
women in 2014.9 Although it is difficult to judge whether the observed discontinuity is 
acceptable based on visible impression, all four covariates in Figures 3.6(a)-3.6(d) vary 
relatively smoothly around the cutoff according to the standard from a previous study 
using the similar methodology (Keats, 2018). 
Third, to ensure that the stipend program only affects women’s school attainment and 
that no change in men’s education is induced, I examine equation (3) by using men in my 
sample in 2014. Results are presented in Appendix Table A3.1. The coefficients of the 
treatment status are not significant and F-statistics for the joint hypothesis of the treatment 
                                               
9We also do not know whether women are originally from the same sample village or move from a non-
sample village due to marriage. 
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status and the interaction term is small. Thus, I conclude no impact of the stipend program 
on male school attainment. 
In addition to the three internal validity checks mentioned above, I also examine 
whether the probability of attrition is smooth around the cutoff as I use the panel data. 
Since most women, who were exposed to the stipend program, were not yet born in the 
first wave of the data in 1988, I instead use the second wave of the data collected in 2000. 
As shown in Appendix Figure A3.3, there is no jump around the cutoff age 16, meaning 
that my estimation is less likely to be distorted because of the incidence of attrition. 
Other potential concerns regarding my estimations are derived from analyzing 
married women (Lefgren and McIntyre, 2006). The first issue is selection bias. Since 
husband’s education and household income are observed only for those women who 
choose to marry, and it is possible that those who choose not to marry have potentially 
lower expected gains from marriage than those who choose to marry, ignoring single 
persons would cause selection bias. This becomes a serious issue in a country where 
marriage probability is low, even among adults. In rural Bangladesh, however, marriage 
is universal. Only 2.1% of women aged above 20 years old remain unmarried in my 
sample. Thus, my estimation is largely free from such selection bias. Second, the issue of 
timing bias becomes a problem if educational investments occur before and after marriage. 
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In my sample, only 1.9% of women aged above 20 remain in a school, indicating that 
educational investment after marriage is very rare in rural Bangladesh. Therefore, the 
timing bias does not have to be considered in my context. 
 
Correlation between the stipend program and educational attainment 
Table 3.3 documents the results of the first-stage regression, which shows the relationship 
between the stipend program and educational attainment of wives in my sample. The 
exposure to the female secondary school stipend program has significantly increased 
women’s education, which is consistent with the aim of this program. The F-statistics for 
the joint hypothesis is relatively small with the range between 2.04 and 7.84, even though 
this is because that I include the interaction term. The F-statistics only for the treatment 
status becomes 9.05 with bandwidth 4, which is less than 10 but still acceptable. The 
results suggest that a woman eligible to the program obtains about 1.2 years more 
schooling than one not exposed to the program, which is equivalent to 24% increase 
relative to women on the right of the cutoff. Compared with findings from existing studies 
that the program increases women’s years of education by 0.36–2.0 years (Hong and Sarr, 
2012; Shamsuddin, 2015), my results seem reasonable. 
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 Table 3.4 presents the disaggregated impact of the stipend program. As I 
discussed in the previous section, the stipend program covering grades 6-8 was available 
for women aged 30 or below, whereas the one covering grades 9-10 was offered to women 
aged 33 or below (see Table 3.2). Utilizing the difference in grades covered by the 
program among cohorts, I create another treatment dummy variable that takes one if 
wife’s age is 33 or below and include two different treatment dummies as well as 
corresponding interaction terms with the age to see whether there is any difference in the 
impact on female schooling. According to Table 3.4, while the treatment status in grades 
6-8 has positive and statistically significant impact on wife’s years of schooling, the 
coefficients of the treatment status in grades 9-10 are positive but not statistically 
significant except bandwidth 8. These findings indicate a larger effect of the stipend 
program for the lower grades. The results also confirm that the effects for the partially 
affected cohorts (born in 1980-1982) are negligible; therefore, it is reasonable to set the 
cutoff age at 30. 
 
Estimate of the effect of education on marriage age and FLFP 
Having shown that the stipend program is significantly correlated to the wife’s 
educational attainment, I now look at the causal effect of women’s education on marriage 
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age and FLFP. Table 3.5 presents the estimation results. One of the dependent variables, 
a FLFP dummy, takes one if wife’s primary or secondary occupation is related to any 
economic activity such as a farm or non-farm job rather than as a housewife. Somewhat, 
surprisingly, my estimation results showed no impact on marriage age and negative 
impact on FLFP. Regarding marriage age, the coefficients of wife’s years of education in 
columns (1)-(4) of Panel A were mostly positive but not statistically significant. 
Meanwhile, the effects of the same variable on FLFP shown in columns (1)-(4) of Panel 
B were negative and statistically significant with some bandwidths. According to the 
coefficient in column (4) of Panel B, an additional year of schooling reduces the 
probability of FLFP by roughly 7 percentage points. Note that education is endogenous 
to both marriage and labor force participation, and I deal with this endogeneity by 
employing 2SLS. Thus, my estimation results clearly indicate that neither FLFP nor age 
of marriage is induced to increase by an additional year of female schooling in my sample. 
For robustness check, I regressed FLFP on years of schooling using a full sample of 
women rather than restricting only to wives. The results of the first-stage and second-
stage regressions are shown in Appendix Table A3.2. The estimated coefficients were 
negative but not statistically significant. 
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These results are inconsistent with the findings from the existing literature, 
which reports that the increased women’s educational attainment induced by the stipend 
program has positive and statistically significant impact on FLFP and marriage age (Hahn 
et al., 2018; Hong and Sarr, 2012; Shamsuddin, 2015). One of the possible reasons for 
this inconsistency might be derived from the difference in methodologies used and the 
coverage of the data set, since all the studies by Hahn et al. (2018), Hong and Sarr (2012), 
and Shamsuddin (2015) employed DID estimation with data covering both rural and 
metropolitan areas; the latter was not covered by the stipend program. 
My finding is highly relevant to policies empowering women because one of the 
objectives of the stipend program is to promote women’s labor market activities through 
enhancing girls’ human capital. As I discussed in the earlier section, there are a number 
of explanations on the relationship between female schooling and labor force 
participation. Among them, Goldin (1997) argues the importance of two factors that 
enable notable increase in FLFP—i.e., the emergence of highly educated women and the 
development of white-collar jobs for women. In my context in rural Bangladesh, both 
factors are hardly in place. Female school attainment in tertiary education is still far 
behind that of male attainment (United Nations, 2014). Moreover, available employment 
opportunities for women in rural villages are restricted to blue-collar and self-
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employment jobs (e.g., maid servant and tailoring). Some limited options for educated 
women are employment as a school teacher and NGO worker, but these fields are highly 
competitive. In addition to Goldin’s two factors, as I will see in the next subsection, the 
strong income effect may be another dominant factor in rural Bangladesh as a result of 
assortative mating and a substantial wage gap between men and women. 
 
Estimates of the effect of education on gains from marriage 
I now proceed to the analysis of another important return to female education—i.e., gains 
from marriage. Columns (1)-(4) of Panel A in Table 3.6 show the linear effect of wife’s 
education on husband’s years of schooling. The results suggest that an additional year of 
education of the wife is associated with an increase in the husband’s education by almost 
1.0 year. As the average years of education of husbands in this subsample were 5.05, a 
1.0-year increase is equivalent to a 19.8% increase in husband’s schooling. The positive 
impact of wife’s education on household per capita income is observed from columns (1)-
(4) of Panel B. Note that household income can be directly affected by the stipend 
program if an educated wife contributes to family income by participating in the labor 
force and generating her own income. To avoid endogeneity between household income 
and wife’s labor force participation, I restricted my sample to wives who are out of the 
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labor market (92% of the total sample) in Table 3.6. By doing so, I can remove a potential 
direct effect of the stipend program on household income generated by wives. Thus, the 
observed impact discussed below is an increase in household income, which is earned by 
other family members. The results indicate that an extra year of education of the wife 
leads to an increase in per capita household income by 5382.5–8403.0 taka. The 
magnitude of this impact is equal to an 18–26% increase.  
I decomposed the household income into farm (such as crop, rice, forestry, fish, and 
farm wage income) and non-farm incomes (such as remittance, business, service, industry, 
and non-farm wage income). According to the estimation results in columns (1)-(4) of 
Panels A and B in Table 3.7, wife’s education increases non-farm income significantly, 
while no impact is observed on farm income. Thus, the increased household income is 
mainly attributed to the increase in non-farm activities of the husband. 
As my estimation removed the wives’ direct income contribution, two channels are 
assumed through which female schooling affects household income. First, education 
would enable women to marry men who have potential in earning high income. As I 
observe in Panel A of Table 3.6, there is a positive impact of wives’ schooling on 
husbands’ educational attainment. If education is one of the signals of income-generating 
ability of husbands, wives’ education would increase household income through 
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assortative mating. Second, women’s education would increase household income 
indirectly through better household resource allocation. As the majority of the wives in 
my sample are housewives, their education may enhance the productivity of the rest of 
the household members by assisting their activities. However, I found no impact of 
women’s schooling on decision-making on market and non-market activities within a 
household such as investment in family business and farm activities, loan, expenditure, 
daily commodity purchase, and issues related to children. 
To supplement my findings, I looked at the effect of wife’s education on husband’s 
decision on foreign migration because the absence of a husband leaves great freedom and 
responsibility for household issues to a wife. My foreign migration dummy captures both 
current foreign migrants and returnees (who have ever migrated and already returned). 
According to column (2) of Panel C in Table 3.7, the husband’s probability of being a 
foreign migrant is increased by 6 percentage points with an additional schooling year of 
the wife. However, I should carefully mention that the coefficient is only statistically 
significant with p-value < 0.10 in the estimation with bandwidth 4. 
In my rural sample, the majority of foreign migrants are temporal migrants. They 
often migrate to countries in Asia and the Middle East and are away from home for several 
years due to high placement cost (Kikkawa and Otsuka, 2016). In such a household in 
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which a husband spends most of his time in foreign countries, his wife must assume the 
role of the household head on behalf of the husband. Moreover, a migrant husband often 
has to rely on his wife on the use of remittance that he sends home. Because of this 
background surrounding foreign migration, it is not surprising to find evidence that the 
wife’s educational attainment is one of the important factors affecting the husband’s 
decision on foreign migration. Thus, women’s education could contribute to household 
income indirectly through their high capability to manage the household. This can be 
another reason for men to choose highly educated women to be their wives. 
 
Estimates of the effect of education on household welfare 
In this subsection, I will shift to explore consequences on household welfare such as 
fertility, children’s schooling, sanitation control, and children’s health. I have examined 
a number of available variables in my data set representing outcomes on health, education, 
sanitation, nutrition, expenditure, and decision-making authority among household 
family members. From all the results, I obtained suggestive evidence particularly in 
fertility, sanitation control, and children’s health. 
 The result of wife’s education on fertility is shown in columns (1)-(4) of Panel 
A in Table 3.8. As my data does not allow me to observe the total fertility given the age 
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of the sample women (age 25-36), I define fertility as the number of births by age 23. 
Although the delayed childbearing does not necessarily reduce the total number of 
children (Balasch and Gratacos, 2012), the variable at least can capture the tendency of 
early pregnancy. According to the result, none of the coefficients of the variable of my 
interest was statistically significant, meaning that education does not affect women’s 
reproductive activity at early age. Note that the author acknowledges the limitation of her 
result that she cannot address the effect on the total fertility yet. To answer this question, 
I have to wait until the time when the sample women reach above a certain reproductive 
age. 
 Columns (1)-(4) of Panel B report the causal effect of wife’s education on young 
family member’s schooling dummy, which takes 1 if ‘any’ family member aged between 
15 and 22 attends a school and zero, otherwise. Because ‘any’ family members are 
included in this estimation sample, they are not necessarily a biological child of a wife 
and are possibly relatives such as sisters or brothers-in-law. I did not restrict the sample 
to ‘biological children’ because the sample women were too young to have children, who 
are at equivalent age to go to higher secondary or tertiary school. As a compromise, I 
expanded the sample of children to any family members aged 15-22, who live in the same 
household. The estimation results shown in the columns (1)-(4) of Panel B present a 
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mixed impact of women’s education on ‘any’ children’s schooling. The sign of the 
coefficients varied across different bandwidths, from which I cannot conclude the actual 
impact on the dependent variable. It may well be that the impact of women’s education 
is limited to their own ‘biological’ children.10 
Columns (1)-(4) of Panel C show the causal effect of wife’s years of education on 
the use of latrine with water seal. In my sample villages, an automatic flush toilet is rarely 
available. Some households still use open toilets or hanging latrines nearby a river or lake, 
and they hardly clean up the sanitary station after use. On the other hand, other households 
make an effort to keep a latrine tidy by cleaning up the sanitary station by water after use. 
No special facility is needed to maintain a clean toilet since water used for the cleaning 
comes from a nearby water well. What family members have to do is to bring some water 
before they use a toilet and use it to clean the bath room afterward. Thus, the level of 
sanitation highly depends on household members’ awareness of the issue. My finding 
indicates that 1 additional year of education of the wife has improved the probability of 
using a toilet with water seal by 16 percentage points. Since 57% of subsample 
households use this type of latrine, this impact is equivalent to a 28% increase in use. 
                                               
10To examine association (not causal effect) between wife’s education and children’s schooling, I also 
regressed OLS with wives aged above 40 years old whose children are old enough, and I obtained 
significant positive association between the two. 
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Let me now move on to the next analysis on children’s health. To capture the 
health status of children, I created a dummy variable that takes 1 if a child reports 
“sometimes sick” or “hardly ever sick” and zero if she/he reports “almost always sick.” 
In my subsample, nearly 90% of the children report that they are healthy. Columns (1)-
(4) of Panel D present the causal effect of wife’s education (mother’s education) on the 
children’s health dummy, which was positive and statistically significant. The estimated 
coefficients suggest that if mother’s education increases by 1 year, children’s probability 
of being healthy increases by 14 percentage points. For both a husband and parents-in-
law, having healthy (grand) children has great importance. If they are aware of the 
positive causality between wife’s education and children’s health, men would prefer to 
have a highly educated woman as their future wife. 
My findings on sanitation control and children’s health are consistent with the 
results of household expenditure and its use. Table 3.9 presents the impact of wives’ 
education on different weekly expenditures. The total household expenditure shown in 
columns (1)-(4) of Panel A increased by 765.7 taka with an extra year of schooling. I also 
disaggregated total expenditure according to its use. For example, weekly expenditure on 
nutritious food items comprises all expenditure on highly nutritious food such as 
vegetables, fruits, meat, and eggs. Expenditure on sanitation items includes spending on 
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soap, detergent, and related items. Medical expenditure covers the cost of medical care 
and medicine. From columns (1)-(4) of Panels B-D, I found that women’s education 
significantly increased all three expenditures. Although no impact of schooling on wife’s 
decision-making authority on household expenditure was observed, it is less likely that a 
husband decides every single purchase such as daily food and sanitary items because most 
household tasks such as cooking and laundry are carried out by women. Therefore, the 
findings on expenditure confirm the contribution of women’s schooling to improvement 
in household welfare such as sanitary control and children’s health. 
 
3.6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, I examined the causal effect of women’s educational attainment on various 
life-time outcomes related to women beyond the formal labor market. To deal with 
potential endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity of education, I adopted a quasi-
experimental design to approximate real randomization. Using the nationwide female 
secondary school stipend program introduced in 1994 as an instrument variable, I 
obtained evidence on the effects of women’s schooling on FLFP, gains from marriage, 
and household welfare. In the context of the long stagnation of FLFP in Bangladesh, 
negative and statistically significant impact of women’s education on FLFP was observed. 
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In contrast, the significantly positive effects of wife’s schooling on husband’s education 
and household income were found, which were attributed to the increase in non-farm 
activities, including husband’s foreign migration. My findings indicate that husband’s 
educational attainment is increased by 1.0 year with an extra year of wife’s education and 
that household income is raised by 18-26% if a wife attains 1 additional year of education. 
The results also show that the increase in household income is mainly from non-farm 
activities, while there is no impact of wife’s education on farm income. This chapter 
further investigated the causal impact of wife’s education on household welfare such as 
sanitation control and children’s human capital. Results suggest that wife’s education has 
positive effect on the household’s probability of using clean latrine and the biological 
children’s probability of being healthy, while it has no effect on the any young family 
member’s probability of being at a school. I also find the positive impact of wife’s 
schooling on household expenditure on nutritious food and sanitation items, which could 
partially contribute to the positive outcome of children’s health. These findings indicate 
that female schooling enhances women’s well-being not through their own market 
activities but through various channels such as marriage and non-market household 
activities. 
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 The chapter suggests two important implications regarding female education and 
its returns. First, modest increase in female education is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for promoting FLFP. I cast doubt on one of the objectives of the stipend 
program, which is to promote women’s labor market activities though enhancing girls’ 
human capital. This is based on the assumption that an increase in female schooling 
should be followed by an increase in FLFP, which would eventually contribute to further 
development of the country. What I found in this study, however, is that the improved 
women’s education rarely enhances their labor market activities in rural Bangladesh, 
although it enhances their well-being through other channels such as marriage and non-
market household activities. Second, despite negative impact of women’s schooling on 
FLFP, investing in female education is still important in a sense to improve women’s 
well-being as I observed its positive effects on husbands’ education, household income, 
and children’s health. Although it is still too early to observe its impact on future 
generations (as their children are still young), as the previous literature indicates, I can 
expect inter-generational benefits from the stipend program such as schooling and labor 
outcomes in the future.  
Based on my results on FLFP, I conjecture that there are other determining 
factors to promote FLFP apart from the modest increase in female education so far 
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achieved by the policy means. Although I cannot identify such factors, this chapter 
provides the more detailed assessment of the impacts of the stipend programs on women’s 
life-time choices as well as their limitation in promoting FLFP. For policymakers, 
particularly those who believe or expect significant monetary returns to investment in 
female secondary schooling accrued from women’s labor market activities rather than 
marriage and non-market household activities, my findings must be helpful to properly 
understand the current situation. In all likelihood, in order to promote FLFP, a broader 
analytical framework, which encompasses both supply and demand factors of female 
labor force, is required to deepen my understanding of the key determinants of FLFP in 
developing countries in general and in Bangladesh in particular. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Long-term Changes in Female Schooling and “Labor Force” Participation: Evidence 
from Rural Bangladesh 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Considering that women accounts for 40% of the global labor force, promoting female 
labor force participation (FLFP) is one of the most important development agendas in 
many developing countries to achieve equitable and sustainable economic growth (Klasen 
and Lamanna, 2009; Young, 1995; Verick, 2014; World Bank, 2012). Beyond the 
country’s economic development and poverty reduction (Bridges et al., 2011), female 
employment, particularly the one associated with earned income, enhances women 
empowerment and well-being of girls and women (Anderson and Eswaran, 2009; Desai 
and Jain, 1994; Kabeer, 2017; Kabeer et al., 2017; Qian, 2008). Active FLFP also benefits 
the next generation. Afridi et al. (2016) find that a mother’s participation in the labor 
force increases schooling outcomes of their children, which is led by greater bargaining 
power of working mothers within households.  
 Despite its importance, labor force participation of women has been persistently 
lower than its male counterpart. According to the World Development Report 2012 
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(World Bank, 2012), the global rate of labor force participation in 1980 and 2009 was 
50.2% and 51.8% for women, while it was 82.0% and 77.7% for men. One of the reasons 
for the reported low FLFP rate is due to the nature of women’s work. As women devote 
more time to housework and childcare than men in both developed and developing 
countries (Berniell and Sánchez-Páramo, 2011), they are often engaged in home-based 
market activities and work as unpaid family labor, which tend to be underreported (Mead 
and Liedholm 1998; Bruhn 2009). In Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, for instance, 
unpaid family labor accounts for more than 60% of total female employment (ILO, 2010). 
Thus, the FLFP rates, particularly the ones in developing countries, tend to underestimate 
women’s actual contribution to the market production (Heintz et al., 2017; Schultz, 1990).  
Given the nature of difference in economic activity between women and men, 
previous literature on FLFP has revealed restricting factors as well as boosting factors, 
which influence women’s decision on labor force participation. One of the restrictions is 
large income effect measured by male wage level, unearned income, and assets (Blau and 
Kahn, 2007; Heim, 2007; Khandker, 1987; Neff et al., 2012; Olsen and Mehta, 2006). 
Prevailing gender norms and culture are another factor that discourages women to work 
outside home (Das 2006; Olsen and Mehta 2006; Neff et al., 2012). Moreover, a 
patriarchy structure leaves women without productive assets (such as land), which makes 
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it difficult for them to be involved in market activities (Cain et al., 1979; Drèze and 
Srinivasan, 1997; Olsen and Mehta, 2006). In addition to the social structure, religion 
often matters for FLFP (Feldmann, 2007; Feldman and McCarthy, 1983; Guiso et al., 
2003; Jaeger, 2010; Norris, 2010). In Muslim societies, for instance, purdah norms often 
discourage women to be engaged in market work outside home (Feldman and McCarthy, 
1983; Guiso et al., 2003; Norris, 2010). 
 Meanwhile, economic development and women’s high education are two 
important factors encouraging women to enter the labor market (World Bank, 2012).11 
The development of non-farm sector, which is associated with economic development, 
often provides women with new employment opportunities (Goldin, 1995). As return to 
education increases, women with high education are more likely to participate in the labor 
force. Some of the examples are a clerical job in the US (Goldin, 1997), the development 
of export-oriented light manufacturing sector in East and Southeast Asia (Klasen and 
Lamanna 2009; Seguino 2000; World Bank 2012), and the rapid growth of IT sector in 
India (Jensen, 2012; Oster & Steinberg, 2013). These studies argue that the development 
                                               
11 As I discussed in Chapter 1, the World Development Report (World Bank, 2012) refers to three factors 
that are responsible for the increase in FLFP: 1) economic development; 2) rising women’s education; 
and 3) declining fertility. Here, I pay special attention to 1) economic development and 2) rising women’s 
education. 
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of new sectors, where educated women have a comparative advantage and face little 
social stigma, has mitigated wage and employment gap between men and women. 
Due to data limitation, previous literature on FLFP has largely relied on 
occupational data to measure women’s market contribution (Blau and Kahn, 2007; 
Gaddis and Klasen 2014; Goldin 1995; Heim, 2007; Hossain et al., 2004; Khandker, 
1987; Klasen and Pieters, 2015; Mammen and Paxson, 2000; Tam 2011). There are a few 
attempts to identify women’s market activity in developing countries using time 
allocation data (Evenson et al., 1980; Khandker, 1988; Mueller, 1984). However, none of 
them disaggregates women’s work based on types of market activities, which is often 
done by literature on FLFP using occupational data in developing counties to capture 
heterogeneous impacts on different kinds of women’s work (Heintz et al. 2017; Bridges 
et al., 2011; Nakajima et al., 2018; Rahman and Islam, 2013).  
To fill the gap in the literature, the purpose of this chapter is to exploit long-term 
changes in factors affecting women’s market activity using detailed time allocation data 
in rural Bangladesh. I use three rounds of a household panel data between 2000 and 2014 
to identify changes in determinants of women’s labor force participation over time. 
Following the previous attempts, my study disaggregates women’s work into farm and 
non-farm jobs, and paid and unpaid work to present differences in effects among these 
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sectors. Analyzing time allocation of women, rather than simply looking at FLFP status, 
is particularly important in developing countries such as Bangladesh because women’s 
contribution to home-based production or self-employed activities are rarely regarded as 
‘work’ and therefore often missing (Heintz et al., 2017; Schultz, 1990). As long as the 
author acknowledge, this is the first study on women’s market activity in a developing 
country using long-term time allocation data. 
The rest of the chapter is composed as follows. The next section provides 
background information on factors affecting FLFP in Bangladesh. Section three describes 
the data used in the chapter. Testable hypotheses and descriptive statistics are presented 
in section four. Section five outlines the estimation strategy to identify changes in factors 
associated with women’s decision on labor market supply, followed by the results of my 
main analysis. Section six offers conclusion and policy implication. 
 
4.2 BACKGROUND  
Bangladesh has experienced fairly rapid economic development thanks to rapid 
industrialization since the 1980s. Figure 4.1 shows long-run change in income per capita 
and sectoral composition of GDP in the country. The share of manufacturing and service 
sector in total GDP increased from 40 % in 1973 to 74% in 2015 with the rise in income 
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per capita. As a result of the non-farm sector development, income sources of rural 
households have shifted from agriculture (mostly in rice production) to non-agriculture 
activities. The share of non-farm income of rural households increased from 44 % in 1988 
to 56 % in 2008, whereas that of farm income dropped from 36 % in 1988 to 20 % in 
2008 in Bangladesh (Estudillo et al., 2013).  The changing structure of household 
income was associated with an income growth; 2.77 times for farmer households and 1.98 
for the landless households, and a decline in the incidence of poverty from 78 % to 26 % 
for the farmer households and 89 % to 59 % for the landless households (Estudillo et al., 
2013).   
One of the particular features of the country’s economy is the development of 
export-oriented industries such as garment and pharmaceutical industries. The 
development of these industries has provided job opportunities to millions of people and 
improved welfare in the country as a whole (Ahmed, 2004; Amin et al., 1998; Amin and 
Sonobe, 2014; Kabeer and Mahmud, 2004; Rhee, 1990). Such development of non-farm 
sector has induced educated women, who used to be housewives with no earned income, 
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to be labor force, thereby increasing return to female education in the country (Ahmed, 
2004; Amin et al., 1998; Asadullah, 2006; Kabeer & Mahmud, 2004; Rhee, 1990). 12 
Meanwhile, the country has experienced substantial improvement in women’s 
education for the last few decades (Asadullah and Chaudhury, 2009; United Nations, 
2014; World Bank, 2012). School enrollment rate at secondary level used to be 14% for 
girls and 27% for boys in 1990 but turned to be 67% for girls and 60% for boys in 2015 
(World Development Indicator, 2017). In contrast to the country’s great achievement in 
female schooling, however, the FLFP rate in Bangladesh has moderately increased at 
slow pace13; 4% in the 1974 Bangladesh Census, 8% in the 1984 Labor Force Survey, 
and 26% in the 2010 Labor Force Survey (Brindges et al., 2011; Heintz et al., 2017). 
Although newly developed industries such as the garment sector have provided 
employment opportunities for women who used to be out of the formal labor market in 
the country (Heath and Mobarak, 2015), those opportunities are still limited in urban areas 
                                               
12 Regarding the specific impact of garment sector development, Heath and Mobarak (2015) examine the 
impact of exposure to garment factories on women’s livelihood by using data covering urban areas near the 
capital city, Dhaka. They report that the presence of garment factory has induced higher likelihood of school 
enrollment among young girls and employment outside of the home among older girls, which has also led 
to delayed marriage and childbearing among women.  
13 One of the reasons for the low FLFP is a nature of women’s work. As women in developing countries 
are often engaged in home-based production or self-employed activities, which are barely regarded as 
‘work,’ the official data tend to underreport their economic contribution (Heintz et al., 2017; Schultz, 1990). 
I overcome this issue by using the time allocation data in the later part of our analysis. 
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near the capital city, Dhaka.14 Moreover, there is still a huge wage gap between women 
and men in the country, and the wage disparity is particularly large in an agriculture 
sector; women’s wage is 42% and 24% lower in agriculture and non-agriculture, 
respectively, according to Hossain et al. (2004). 
Despite the country’s development, rural villages in Bangladesh are characterized 
as strong patriarchy and kinship structures (Amin, 1997; Kabeer, 2000; Kabeer, 1997; 
Cain et al. 1979). Gender norms that regard women as economic liabilities are widely 
prevailing (Heintz et al., 2017; Hossain et al., 2004), and women’s mobility in the public 
domain is highly restricted due to purdah norms (Amin, 1997; Feldman & McCarthy, 
1983; Kabeer, 2000; Kabeer, 1997). Although household’s attitudes towards female 
schooling has shifted in favoring girls over years, meaning that parents have become keen 
on investing in girls’ schooling (Blunch and Das, 2007; Hossain, 2004), social stigma 
against women’s work other than home-based production is still persistent. As described 
by Heintz et al. (2017), the majority of women in rural villages still prefer the work inside 
the home (such as rearing livestock and poultry, tailoring, teaching, and handcraft 
                                               
14There are large clusters of garment factories in Dhaka and Gazipur, particularly in the Tongi area. I can 
find a number of women working at factories as paid workers. They often commute from a nearby village 
or stay in a special apartment (dorm), which is often provided and organized by a factory. See the article 
by Heath and Mobarak (2015) for a more detailed story of positive impacts of garment jobs on female 
schooling and FLFP. 
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making) and recognize negative community perception about their engagement in jobs 
outside the home (such as maid servant, daily wage labor, begging, and garment work).  
 
4.3 DATA  
Data 
The present chapter uses three rounds of a household panel data set “Livelihood System 
of Rural Households Panel Data” in 2000-2014 collected by late Dr. Mahabub Hossain 
of the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC). The data contained 
household information (e.g., amount of owned land, use of fertilizer, and investments in 
family businesses), individual information (e.g., age, gender, education, and occupation), 
and village-level information (e.g., distance to district head quarter). In addition to the 
basic information on each individual of the sample households, I use the unique time 
allocation data for my analysis on women’s time allocation (see Chapter 2 for more details 
about the data sets). As the time allocation data is only available for family members 
currently staying in the sample villages, migrant household members are excluded from 
my analysis. 
 
General Descriptive Statistics 
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In my analysis, I focus on women in the age group 25-60, most of whom have completed 
education and already married.15 I exclude women who are head of household (5-11 %) 
because most of their husband are absent due to migration, which would have different 
effects on women’s decision regarding labor force participation. Table 4.1 summarizes 
basic statistics of selected individual and household variables over years. Since the initial 
year of 2000, there has been a substantial improvement in gender equality in education. 
The average years of schooling in 2000 was 2.57 for women and 3.91 for men, whereas 
both genders have achieved 4.68 years on average in 2014. Likewise, the proportion of 
being illiterate among sample women has decreased from 54% in 2000 to 34% in 2014, 
while that of completing primary, secondary, or high secondary school has substantially 
increased over years. In 2014, approximately 38% of my sample women completed 
secondary or higher education (the same proportion was only 18% in 2000).  
In contrast to education, however, FLFP rate using the occupational data shows 
little improvement over years: It was 6% in 2000 and slightly decreased to 9% in 2014. 
Interestingly, however, the time allocation data reports that 64-73% of women spend at 
least one hour on paid or unpaid work for the last four days, which is contrasting to the 
                                               
15 I excluded “never married” women (1% of the sample) from my analysis as they are largely different 
from “ever married” women by its nature in rural Bangladesh. 
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low FLFP using the occupational data. Large gap in reported economic activity of women 
between the occupational data and the time allocation data is derived from its definition. 
To collect the occupational data, a questionnaire simply asks each household member’s 
primary and secondary occupation, which is an activity on which an individual spends 
most of her/his time. As I will discuss in a following paragraph, most of the sample 
women spend majority of their time on housework; therefore, they answered to the 
occupational question as “housewife.” Meanwhile, the time allocation questionnaire asks 
household member’s any activities (both market and non-market) on which s/he spends 
at least one hour during the last four days (see Annex 1 for the sample questionnaire). 
Thus, the definition of work is more relaxed with the time allocation data. The reported 
difference in FLFP between the occupational data and the time allocation data confirms 
the importance of using time allocation data to fully capture women’s market contribution 
as most of their activities are not revealed in the occupational data. 
The table also suggests that farming is still dominant sector in the sample villages: 
It accounts for half of the household head’s occupation over years. However, proportion 
of non-farm income has increased substantially from 32% in 1988 to 62% in 2014. 
Moreover, household assets have gradually shifted from farm to non-farm sector, 
suggested by the increase in non-land assets and the decline in the amount of owned land 
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per household. Other important change is a number of children aged 0-4: It has decreased 
from 0.40 in 2000 to 0.24 in 2014. 
Table 4.2 decomposes women’s time allocation by different activities. Paid or 
unpaid work indicates any activities in the productive category. The majority of women 
spend their time on unpaid work, particularly on unpaid farm jobs (58-68%). In both farm 
and non-farm sectors, the probability of spending time on unpaid work is higher than that 
on paid work. The proportion of women who allocate time on paid work is quite low, 
around 4-5%. Looking at the total hours spent on each activity, I observe that women 
spend more than half of their time on housework or childcare (25 hours out of total 40-
45 hours). With condition on participation in each category, women spend longer hours 
on paid work (21-24 hours) than on unpaid work (8 hours), meaning that once women are 
engaged in paid work, they tend to spend longer time. Interestingly, hours spend on farm 
and non-farm activities are indifferent in both paid and unpaid work. Lastly, it is notable 
that there is huge gap between women and men in total income and time allocation 
between paid or unpaid work and housework (Appendix Table A4.1). 
 
4.4 HYPOTHESIS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Hypothesis 
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A transformation of economy often leads to changes in return to human capital investment 
including education. While farm land is a major source of income and important 
depository of wealth in rural communities in the early stage of economic development in 
general, economic growth and structural change of an economy from its dependence on 
agriculture to industry and services make human capital more important (Estudillo et al, 
2009), and education level becomes an important factor to promote non-farm 
participation (Cherdchuchai and Otsuka, 2006; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2001; Estudillo 
and Otsuka, 1999; Eswaran et al., 2009; Huang et al., 2009; Matsumoto et al., 2006; 
Takahashi and Otsuka, 2009). As education could have higher return in non-farm than 
farming jobs and change women’s occupational preference, I hypothesize that high 
educational attainment is an important factor for women’s work in non-farm sector but 
not in farm sector. 
 Regarding paid work, the emergence of non-traditional paid work opportunities 
for women, which are associated with little social stigma, and women’s higher education 
are two important factors to promote FLFP (Boserup, 1970; Chaudhary and Verick, 2014; 
Gaddis and Klasen, 2014; Goldin, 1995; Mammen and Paxson, 2000; Schultz, 1990; Tam, 
2011). The two key factors are positively correlated and together boost women’s active 
market work (Goldin, 1997; Jensen, 2012; Klasen and Lamanna 2009; Oster & Steinberg, 
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2013; Seguino 2000; World Bank 2012). Following the literature, I hypothesize that 
women’s educational attainment is positively associated with paid work, whereas it is 
negatively correlated with unpaid job. 
Positive correlation between higher education and women’s labor force 
participation, however, declines as an expansion of schooling supply and positive 
marriage market return to women’s education (Klasen and Pieters, 2015). As positive 
relationship between two could partially reflect a upward selection bias, meaning that 
having high education and entering the labor market are both outcomes of some 
unobservable characteristics (such as individual ‘ability’), this selection effect would 
change over time due to external factors affecting schooling supply and marriage market 
return. As I showed in Chapter 3, the nation-wide secondary school stipend program in 
1994 has substantially increased women’s years of education in Bangladesh. In the same 
chapter, I also found the positive marriage market returns to female schooling, measured 
by husband’s education and household income. Another factor diminishing the positive 
relationship between the two is an income effect, where women are more likely to 
withdraw from the labor market as household income rises. Given the positive impact of 
women’s education on household income, which is not earned by women themselves (as 
seen in Chapter 3), the higher income would reduce the need for women to generate 
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additional income through participating in the labor market. With all three factors: the 
expansion of schooling supply, positive marriage market returns, and the income effect, 
I hypothesize that positive association between women’s time on non-farm or paid work 
and high education has become weak over years. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Before moving to estimation strategy, I will closely look at women’s economic 
activity by different educational groups. Table 4.3 shows the summary statistics on 
women’s time allocation based on the highest completed schooling in 2000 (Panel A) and 
in 2014 (Panel B). Although there is no difference in the probability of spending at least 
one hour on paid or unpaid work across groups, type of activities and total hours spent on 
each category substantially differ. For example, women who have high secondary or 
above education are more likely to spend time on non-farm work (19% in 2000 and 16% 
in 2014) and paid work (28% in 2000 and 23% in 2014) than any other education groups. 
The relationship between women’s probability of spending time on farm/non-farm work 
and years of schooling is shown in Figures 4.2(a) and 4.2(b). The probability of farm 
work decreases as women’s education rises, while that of non-farm increases along 
female schooling years. Figures 4.2(c) and 4.2(d) shows the correlation between years of 
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schooling and time spent on farm and non-farm work conditional on participation, 
respectively. In both figures, the negative relationship of farm and the positive correlation 
of non-farm remain, although the slopes are moderate. 
Likewise, Figures 4.3(a) and 4.3(b) present the association between women’s 
educational attainment and probability of spending on paid and unpaid work, respectively. 
Similar to Figures 4.2(a) and 4.2(b), there is positive relationship between years of 
education and the probability of paid work, whereas the probability of unpaid work is 
negatively correlated with schooling years. Interestingly, however, no association is 
observed between women’s education and time spent on paid and unpaid work, 
conditional on participation in Figures 4.3(c) and 4.3(d). In both figures, the slope is flat, 
indicating hours spent on each work neither increase nor decrease along schooling years. 
Table 4.4 describes the top 5 women’s farm work for all, less educated, and highly 
educated women in 2000 and 2014. Interestingly, the composition of farm work is 
indifferent between two groups over years. In both, livestock and poultry rearing, which 
is traditionally regarded as women’s work, accounts for more than 80% of women’s farm 
work. The top 5 women’s non-farm work is presented in Table 4.5. Although there are 
some similarities in types of work between two education groups (such as Nursing, NGO 
work, Social work, and Business), the observed distribution differs. For example, Cottage 
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industry and Maid servant, which are regarded as traditional paid work and require little 
education, are observed only among less educated women. Meanwhile, highly educated 
women are more likely to be involved in Service and Tailoring.  
From my informal interviews in some of the sample villages, I heard from village 
women that they needed at least lower secondary education to be a tailor, because 
vocational training schools of tailoring work often asked them to have basic education. 
As for service, however, the author cannot identify whether this is low-skilled or high-
skilled service work due to the data limitation. In the questionnaire, category of “Service” 
is given as an answer option without specification; therefore, the service category cannot 
be disaggregated based on the nature of its work. The author acknowledge heterogeneity 
of service work, particularly in developing countries, and understand that some of the 
service work would not require high education. 
 
4.5 ANALYSIS ON WOMEN’S LABOR SUPPLY DECISION 
Empirical Strategy 
In this section, I identify factors associated with women’s time allocation to different 
types of work. I am interested in: 1) whether women are engaged in each type of work; 
and 2) how many hours they spend on each type of work, conditional on their participation. 
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As I showed in Table 4.2, more than a quarter of women do not spend their time on each 
work; therefore, OLS estimation would be bias. Some of the previous studies use 
Heckman model; however, exclusion restriction in the model is not likely to be satisfied 
in my analysis. Instead, I employ the “double-hurdle” (DH) model (Cragg, 1971), 
following a study by Takahashi et al. (2016). The model allows me to assume that the 
first decision of participation is followed by the second decision of hours spent, which is 
reasonable as a women’s decision making process in the labor market.  
The decision making process of the DH model is the following: 
𝑑𝑖𝑡 = {
 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑡
∗ =  𝑚𝑖𝑡𝛼𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑡 > 0
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
               (1) 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = {
𝑦∗ 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ =  𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑖𝑡
∗ > 0
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
     (2) 
where, 𝑑𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable, which takes one if a woman i is engaged in each type 
of work at least one hour for the last four days in year t (t = 2000, 2008, 2014), 𝑦 shows 
the number hours spent on each type of work by a woman i during the last four days in 
year t, 𝑑∗  and 𝑦∗  are the unobserved latent variables, m and X are vectors of 
explanatory variables, and 𝛼  and 𝛽  are estimated coefficients. I run this model 
separately for each year.  
 Following the previous studies (Cragg, 1971; Takahashi et al., 2016), I assume 
that the first-stage error term 𝛿𝑖𝑡 and the second-stage error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are independently 
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and normally distributed with zero mean at each year, conditional on observed covariates. 
Given the error terms, the log-likelihood function for the DH model is equivalent to the 
sum of the log-likelihoods of a probit model and truncated regression model. Therefore, 
I can produce the consistent estimates with the DH model by examining separate 
regressions for (1) with the probit and (2) with the truncated regression.  
As the explanatory variables, I include: i) a set of individual characteristics 
including, age, age square, education dummies, which measures the highest education 
completed with illiterate as the reference level, and marital status dummies, which 
indicates women’s marital status with the married as the reference level; ii) a set of 
household characteristics including head’s education dummies with illiterate as the 
reference level, head’s occupation dummies with farming occupation as the reference 
level, the number of children aged 0-4, the number of male family members aged between 
16 and 60, a parent dummy, which takes 1 if household head and spouse live with their 
parents, log of non-land assets, total amount of owned land (in hectare), a Muslim dummy, 
an electrification dummy, which takes 1 if household has access to electricity; and iii) a 
set of village characteristics including average hours of women’s paid/unpaid work in a 
village, distance to sub district (upazila) head quarter (in 100m), and seasonal dummies 
with busy time as the reference level. The model is estimated separately for each year to 
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allow for changes in behavior over time. Standard errors are clustered at village level and 
division dummies are added to control for division specific effects. 
 
Results 
Table 4.6 presents the results of the first-stage probit estimation, which reports marginal 
effects. Columns (1)-(3) show the estimated coefficients on farm work. The coefficients 
of women’s education are all negative except in 2008, and those of high secondary and 
above education are statistically significant in 2000 and 2014, indicating that educated 
women are less likely to be involved in farm work. The coefficients of husband’s non-
farm occupation status and unemployment status are also negative and statistically 
significant, suggesting that women in farm household are more likely to spend time on 
farm activity. The results of non-farm work are listed in columns (4)-(6). The estimated 
coefficients of low and high secondary education are positive over years. However, their 
magnitude as well as statistical significance have changed from the initial year. The 
coefficient of low secondary has declined from 0.074 in 2000 to 0.023 in 2008 and 0.003 
in 2014, and the coefficient is statistically significant only in 2000. Likewise, the 
estimated parameter of high and above education has shifted from 0.25 in 2000 to 0.10 in 
2008 and 0.046 in 2014, and its statistical significance disappears in 2014. The findings 
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suggest that the positive association between women’s high education and the probability 
of spending time on non-farm work has diminished over years. 
 To compare the results of farm and non-farm work using the time allocation data 
to those using the occupational data, I examine multinomial probit model using the 
occupational data and show the results (marginal effects) in Appendix Table A4.2 and 
A4.3. From the tables, I find that sign of the estimated coefficients as well as the pattern 
of change in magnitude of parameter are quite similar. For example, most of the 
coefficients of women’s education on farm work are negative and significant, meaning 
that educated women are less likely to have farm occupation. In contrast, decision on 
spending time on non-farm work and female schooling are positively correlated. However, 
magnitude of the parameters of low and high secondary education on non-farm work has 
declined over years.  
 Columns (7)-(9) show the estimation results of unpaid work. The coefficients of 
high and above secondary education are negative over years and statistically significant 
in 2000 and 2014, suggesting that educated women are less likely to spend time on unpaid 
work. The estimated parameters of husband’s occupation with the reference of farm work 
are also negative, and some of them are significant, indicating that unpaid work is more 
likely to be associated with farming activity. The results of paid work is presented in 
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columns (10)-(12). Interestingly, magnitude and significance of the coefficients of 
women’s education have changed over years. The coefficient of low secondary education 
has shifted from 0.06 in 2000 to -0.004 in 2008 and 0.002 in 2014, and it is only 
statistically significant in 2000. The parameter of high and above secondary education is 
significant in all years. However, its magnitude has decline from 0.143 in 2000 to 0.082 
in 2008 and 0.056 in 2014. Like non-farm work, the findings indicate that the positive 
correlation between women’s high education and the probability of spending time on paid 
work has weakened over years. 
 Table 4.7 shows the results of the second-stage truncated regression, which also 
reports marginal effects. The results of farm work are listed in columns (1)-(3). There is 
negligible correlation between women’s high education and hours spent on farm, 
conditional on women’s participation, particularly in later years. The sign of coefficients 
of low and high secondary education is both negative in 2000 (with statistical significance 
for low secondary), although that in 2014 has become positive and statistically 
insignificant, meaning that there is little difference in time spent on farm work between 
illiterate women and women with some education. In contrast, level of head’s education 
has become an important factor in later years. Magnitude of the coefficient of head’s low 
secondary and high secondary has shifted -0.786 in 2000 to -2.699 in 2014, and from 
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1.542 to -2.688 in 2014, respectively. Both parameters have statistical significance in 
2014, suggesting that women in farm work with educated household head spend less 
hours on farm activity in a recent year. Another interesting factor is the number of 
children aged 0-4, which is negatively correlated with women’s time on farm work. 
However, its magnitude has diminished over years. Lastly, the observed negative 
association between head’s occupation and hours on farm work indicates that women 
with head involved in farming spends longer hours on farm activity. 
 Columns (4)-(6) report the results of non-farm work. Positive correlation 
between women’s high education and time spent on non-farm work, conditional on 
participation, has diminished over years. Magnitude of the coefficient has changed from 
17.913 (significant) in 2000 to 6.997 (insignificant) in 2008 and 5.608 (insignificant) in 
2014, indicating that higher education in non-farm work no longer predicts women’s 
longer time spent on the work. It is also notable that widow, separated, or divorced women 
in non-farm sector are more likely to spent longer hours than the rest. Unlike farm work, 
most of the coefficients of head’s education and occupation are statistically insignificant, 
suggesting that women’s hours on non-farm work are less likely to be influenced by 
household head’s characteristics.  
75 
 
 The results of unpaid work are presented in columns (7)-(9). There is no 
correlation between women’s education and hours spent on unpaid work, conditional on 
women’s participation. In contrast, household head’s characteristics have become 
influential factors on women’s unpaid work, particularly in later years. For example, the 
coefficient of head’s high and above education has shifted from 1.315 (insignificant) in 
2000 to -1.671 (significant) in 2014, meaning that women in unpaid work with educated 
head tend to spend less hours on unpaid work. Columns (10)-(12) show the results of paid 
work. There is an interesting change over years in relationship between women’s 
education and hours spent on paid work, conditional on participation. The coefficient of 
low secondary education has shifted from -6.363 (insignificant) in 2000, to -9.798 
(significant) in 2008 and -19.195 (significant) in 2014. Although the parameters of high 
and above secondary education are all statistically insignificant, their sign as well as 
magnitude have changed over years from 4.225 in 2000 to 3.211 in 2008 and -8.373 in 
2014. The finding indicates that educated women in paid work tend to spend less hours 
on the work, and this tendency has become larger in later years. In contrast, women’s 
hours on paid work are positively correlated with head’s high education, meaning that 
women in paid work with educated head spend longer time on the work. Women’s time 
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on paid work are also influenced by head’s occupation. The reported results suggest that 
women with household head engaged in farming spend less hours on paid work. 
 
4.6 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter examined the associated factors of women’s labor participation decision and 
time allocation to the different types of work in rural Bangladesh. Using the household 
panel data covering 2000-2014, which contained the unique time allocation data, I 
identified the long-term changes in factors correlated with women’s decision on labor 
supply over years. The analysis was particularly unique as it used the time allocation data, 
which captured women’s actual market contribution in rural Bangladesh, where women’s 
work tended to be underestimated. In fact, according to the occupational data, only 10% 
of women reported that they had an occupation in the labor market, although the time 
allocation data presented that nearly 64-73% of women spent at least one hour on paid or 
unpaid market work for the last four days.  
Before the estimation, I constructed three hypotheses on the relationship between 
women’s education and work: 1) high educational attainment is an important factor for 
women’s work in non-farm sector but not in farm sector; 2) women’s educational 
attainment is positively associated with paid work, whereas it is negatively correlated 
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with unpaid work; and 3) positive association between women’s non-farm or paid work 
and high education has diminished over years. As for labor participation, I found that the 
results of probit model, which examined women’s decision on whether they spend at least 
one hour on each type of work, support all three hypotheses. Women’s decision on 
participating in non-farm work or paid work is positively correlated with high education, 
while that on participating farm work or unpaid work is negatively associated. Moreover, 
I found that the positive relationship between non-farm/paid work and high education has 
diminished over years, which partially indicates the weakened positive selection bias due 
to the expansion of schooling supply, the positive marriage market returns to female 
education, and the income effect. 
As for time allocation, however, I found that some of the results of truncated 
regression, which examined women’s decision on how many hours they spend on each 
type of work, are not consistent with my hypotheses. First, my findings suggested that 
there is no relationship between women’s education and hours spent on farm work or 
unpaid work, conditional on participation. Second, I found that time spent on paid work, 
conditional on participation, is negatively correlated with female schooling, and the 
negative relationship has become strong over years. The last finding is interesting to 
interpret. As paid work in rural Bangladesh is heterogeneous in general, which varies 
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from teaching job to maid servant, for instance, its wage as well as required working hours 
may substantially differ. During my informal interviews in some of the sample villages, 
I heard that teaching job, which requires a secondary school completion certificate, is the 
most popular among educated women because of its short working hours and high wage. 
Indeed, the teaching profession has increased among women thanks to a policy of 
recruiting female teachers in primary and secondary schools to avoid sexual abuse 
(Schurmann, 2009). In contrast, low-skilled paid work, such as domestic services are 
often associated with low wages and long hours of work. If this is the case, the observed 
finding is quite reasonable. Moreover, increasing gap in time spent on paid work between 
illiterate women and highly educated women would partially indicate an increase in other 
factors, such as wage inequality. Although the issue is important to investigate, it is above 
the scope of this chapter. 
My study could contribute to the future policies to promote women’s economic 
activity in Bangladesh by providing suggestive evidences. First of all, the difference in 
the results between women’s labor participation decision and time allocation decision 
implied the importance of using both occupational data and time allocation data to 
correctly measure women’s market contribution. As most of the surveys, including the 
census, use only occupational data, women’s actual economic activity is likely to be 
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unrevealed, particularly in developing countries. As for the labor participation, promoting 
women’s higher education as well as availability of non-farm/paid work are most desired. 
Although the strong correlation between women’s work and education is weakened at 
secondary school level, there is still room to invest in female education given the large 
gender disparity in tertiary schooling in the country. As for the hours of work, however, 
longer working hours are not necessarily desirable for both women and the country as a 
whole. The important thing is productivity, and in that sense, women’s productivity is 
low given the fact that the majority of women devote their time on unpaid work. Therefore, 
lifting those women from unpaid to paid work is the first step to increase women’s welfare 
as well as to achieve sustainable development in the country. 
CHAPTER 5 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
In this thesis, I provided empirical evidence toward a better understanding on female 
schooling and FLFP in rural Bangladesh. In the first analysis (Chapter 3), I examined the 
causal effect of women’s educational attainment on various life-time outcomes related to 
women beyond the formal labor market. To deal with potential endogeneity and 
unobserved heterogeneity of education, I used the nationwide female secondary school 
stipend program introduced in 1994 as an instrument variable, and obtained evidence on 
the effects of women’s schooling on FLFP, gains from marriage, and household welfare.  
The results suggested that the positive effects of the stipend program, while its 
impact was largely concentrated to women who have low education. As the average years 
of education of my sample was around 5, the induced increase of years of schooling by 
1.0 year lifted women’s educational attainment only from primary to lower secondary 
level. The analysis also presented the negative and statistically significant impact of 
women’s education on FLFP, whereas there were the significantly positive effects of 
wife’s schooling on husband’s education and household income, which were attributed 
to the increase in non-farm activities. The chapter further investigated the causal impact 
81 
 
of wife’s education on household welfare such as sanitation control and children’s human 
capital. Results suggested that wife’s education has positive effect on the sanitation 
control and children’s human capital. These findings indicated that female schooling 
enhances women’s well-being not through their own market activities but through various 
channels such as marriage and non-market household activities. 
In the second analysis of this thesis (Chapter 4), I examined the elements 
associated with women’s labor force participation and time allocation to four different 
types of work in rural Bangladesh. Using the unique time allocation data in 2000-2014, I 
identified the long-term changes in factors correlated with women’s decision on labor 
supply over years. The use of the time allocation data was particularly important to 
capture women’s actual market contribution in rural Bangladesh, where only 10% of 
women reported that they had an occupation in the labor market, according to the 
occupational data, although the time allocation data presented that nearly 64-73% of 
women spent at least one hour on paid or unpaid market work for the last four days.  
As for the participation decision, the findings supported the three hypotheses on 
the relationship between women’s education and work: 1) high educational attainment is 
an important factor for women’s work in non-farm sector but not in farm sector; 2) 
women’s educational attainment is positively associated with paid work, whereas it is 
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negatively correlated with unpaid work; and 3) positive association between women’s 
non-farm or paid work and high education has diminished over years. As for time 
allocation, however, I found that some of the results were not consistent with my 
hypotheses. First, my findings suggested that there was no relationship between women’s 
education and hours spent on farm work or unpaid work, conditional on participation. 
Second, I found that time spent on paid work, conditional on participation, was negatively 
correlated with female schooling, and the negative relationship had become strong over 
years. The results suggest that educated women are more likely to be involved in high-
skilled paid work, where hours of work is short and possibly wages are high, whereas less 
educated women are more likely to be engaged in low-skilled paid work, where hours of 
work is long and possibly wages are low. 
The negative effect of female education on FLFP observed in the Chapter 3 and 
the positive association between women’s high education and labor participation decision 
seem to be puzzling at the first glance. However, these findings suggest a strong U-shaped 
relationship between education of women and FLFP, suggesting that women who have 
low or very high education are more likely to participate in the labor market, while those 
who gain moderate education (those at the bottom of the U shape) are less likely to do so 
due to social stigma against low-skilled jobs (Klasen and Pieters, 2015). In the Chapter 3, 
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the impact on FLFP was estimated based on the increase in years of education from 5 
years to slightly more than 6 years (Please see Tables 3.3), which is equivalent to the 
complete of primary education. In the analysis in the Chapter 4, primary education is 
negatively correlated with paid work, which is regarded as “work” in the occupational 
data. The positive correlation between education and paid work is only for women who 
have secondary education. Therefore, my findings in the Chapter 3 and the Chapter 4 are 
consistent. 
The findings of the analysis in this thesis carry important policy implications. 
First, modest increase in female education, such as from primary to lower secondary level, 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for promoting FLFP. Combining the negative 
impact of the moderate increase in female schooling on FLFP in the Chapter 3 and the 
estimated negative coefficients of primary education dummy on paid work participation 
in the Chapter 4, I conjecture that there are other determining factors to promote FLFP 
apart from the modest increase in female education so far achieved by the stipend program. 
Second, the study confirms the importance of using time allocation data to correctly 
capture women’s actual market contribution, particularly in rural Bangladesh. As most of 
the women in rural village spend their time on unpaid work, which is often missing in 
occupational data, heavy dependence on only occupation information would not be 
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enough to obtain a whole picture of women’s work. Third, the findings suggested that the 
promotion of women’s higher education and the development of non-farm/paid sector are 
two important factors to increase women’s welfare and to achieve sustainable 
development in Bangladesh. Further government efforts are expected to promote female 
schooling in the country, as there is still large gender disparity in tertiary education. 
Moreover, increasing employment opportunities in non-farm sector is highly desired. 
Third, although the observed impact of the stipend program on FLFP was different from 
what the program initially aimed, investing in female education is still important in a 
sense to improve women’s well-being as we observed its positive effects on husbands’ 
education, household income, and children’s health.  
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Tables 
Tables 2.1 Composition of Sample Households in Each Survey Year 
Year (1) Sample 
households in the 
previous survey 
(2) Attrited 
households 
(3) Newly added 
households 
(4) Split households (5) Total sample 
households = (1) 
– (2) + (3) + (4) 
2000 1240 236(19%) 429 450 1883 
2008 1883 132 (7%) 89 170 2010  
2014 2010 229 (11%) 633 432 2846  
Note: Attrited households = households that went missing in the following survey round 
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Table 2.2 Determinants of Attrition: Sample Women Aged 25-60 
Dependent variable: Attrited household = 1 
 (1) 
 1988 
  
Age of the member -0.032 
 (0.034) 
age square 0.000 
 (0.000) 
Primary 0.036 
 (0.118) 
Secondary 0.162 
 (0.205) 
Widow/ Separated/ Divorced 0.041 
 (0.144) 
Female Labor Force Participation 0.195 
 (0.178) 
Head: Primary 0.109 
 (0.107) 
Head: Secondary 0.273* 
 (0.145) 
Head: High secondary and above 0.021 
 (0.206) 
Head: Non-farm/Non-primary 0.024 
 (0.117) 
Head: Not working 0.439* 
 (0.266) 
Number of children aged 0-4 0.068 
 (0.061) 
Number of working age male members (15<age<61) -0.114*** 
 (0.043) 
1 = if living with parent(s) 0.011 
 (0.126) 
Log of loans -0.005 
 (0.010) 
Log of non-land assets -0.022* 
 (0.013) 
Owned land of hh (ha) -0.163** 
 (0.067) 
1= if Muslim -0.212 
 (0.152) 
Access to electricity -0.090 
 (0.147) 
% of non-farm village labor force 0.008 
 (0.011) 
% of village women in the labor force -0.004 
 (0.005) 
Travel distance to upazila HQ -0.004 
 (0.012) 
Chittagong -0.264 
 (0.254) 
Sylhet -0.068 
 (0.186) 
Barisal 0.006 
 (0.200) 
Khulna -0.456*** 
 (0.154) 
Rajshahi -0.144 
 (0.126) 
Constant 0.411 
 (0.672) 
Observations 1038 
Note: Attrited households = women’s households that went missing in the following survey round, Standard errors in parentheses, Standard 
errors clustered at village level, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, Base head’s education = Illiterate, Base head’s occupation = Farming, Base 
division = Dhaka 
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics of Selected Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All sample Subsample (24<wife’s age<37) 
 Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation 
Wife’s age 39.59 12.53 30.70 3.59 
Wife’s years of education 4.28 3.86 5.56 3.79 
Wife’s marriage age  16.87 2.64 17.33 2.66 
Wife’s working status (=1 if working) 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.28 
Fertility by wife’s age 23 0.97 0.86 1.35 0.84 
Husband's age 47.42 13.70 38.21 5.99 
Husband's years of education 4.80 4.70 5.40 4.74 
Husband’s marriage age 22.06 7.27 21.00 8.67 
1= if Muslim 0.92 0.27 0.91 0.29 
Owned land of household (ha) 0.40 0.72 0.27 0.63 
Log of non-land fixed asset 8.91 1.68 8.78 1.61 
1= if access to electricity  0.73 0.44 0.73 0.45 
Household per capita income (100 
Tk) 
362.79 321.37 327.33 282.19 
Observations (no.) 2565 2565 933 933 
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Table 3.2 Eligibility of Cohort for the Female Secondary Stipend Program 
 Year Birth year 
  1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
1990 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1     
1991   8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1   
1992   9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
1993   10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
1994     10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 
1995       10 9 8 7 6 5 4 
1996         10 9 8 7 6 5 
1997           10 9 8 7 6 
1998             10 9 8 7 
                10 9 8 
                  10 9 
                    10 
                      
Age in 2014 37-36 36-35 35-34 34-33 33-32 32-31 31-30 30-29 29-28 28-27 
Notes: Highlighted parts indicate the eligible grade covered by the stipend program. 
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Table 3.3 The Impact of the Female Secondary Stipend Program on Wife’s Years of Education: Results of First-stage Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 BW3 BW4 BW5 BW6 
Treatment = 1 1.240** 1.173** 0.852* 0.837** 
 (0.467) (0.390) (0.429) (0.359) 
Treat*(Age-30) -0.312 -0.299 -0.012 0.024 
 (0.222) (0.176) (0.115) (0.081) 
(Age-30) 0.144 0.067 -0.118 -0.150** 
 (0.143) (0.117) (0.106) (0.053) 
Constant 2.932 3.002* 3.114*** 3.033*** 
 (1.562) (1.427) (0.876) (0.670) 
F-statistics 7.84 5.48 2.04 2.73 
Mean of dep. var. in right if the 
cutoff 
5.09 5.06 5.01 4.85 
Observations (no.) 455 573 724 933 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at cohort level, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3.4 The Disaggregate Impact of the Female Secondary Stipend Program on Wife’s Years of Education 
 (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 BW5 BW6 BW7 BW8 
Treatment in grades 6-8 1.133** 1.219*** 1.309*** 1.362*** 
 (0.405) (0.373) (0.345) (0.312) 
Treatment in grades 9-10 -0.408 0.278 0.520 0.937** 
 (0.471) (0.286) (0.327) (0.429) 
Treat*(Age-30) -0.185 -0.216 -0.256 -0.273* 
 (0.194) (0.165) (0.160) (0.155) 
Treat*(Age-33) 0.674* 0.280 0.213 0.026 
 (0.362) (0.168) (0.181) (0.172) 
(Age-30) -0.619* -0.189*** -0.081 0.122 
 (0.276) (0.058) (0.100) (0.096) 
(Age-33) omitted omitted omitted omitted 
     
Constant 5.291*** 3.219*** 2.752*** 1.797** 
 (1.390) (0.627) (0.697) (0.756) 
Observations (no.) 724 933 1018 1141 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at cohort level, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3.5 The Impact of Wife’s Years of Education on Marriage Age and FLFP: Results of Second-stage Regression (2SLS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 BW3 BW4 BW5 BW6 
Panel A: Marriage age 
Years of education 0.120 -0.042 0.222 0.305 
 (0.283) (0.131) (0.510) (0.462) 
(Age - 30) -0.015 -0.089* 0.046 0.037 
 (0.117) (0.047) (0.161) (0.131) 
Husband's age 0.016 0.009 -0.013 0.007 
 (0.038) (0.035) (0.039) (0.029) 
Constant 17.224*** 18.183*** 17.012*** 15.389*** 
 (1.239) (1.377) (1.338) (1.387) 
Observations (no.) 453 569 720 929 
Mean of dep. var. in right of the cutoff 17.18 17.11 17.10 17.20 
Panel B: 1 = FLFP 
Years of education -0.037** -0.004 -0.064 -0.076** 
 (0.019) (0.029) (0.050) (0.036) 
(Age - 30) 0.007 0.006 -0.011 -0.015* 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.014) (0.008) 
Husband's age -0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Constant 0.506** 0.305* 0.405 0.404** 
 (0.201) (0.178) (0.271) (0.201) 
Observations (no.) 455 573 724 932 
Mean of dep. var. in right of the cutoff 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at cohort level, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3.6 The Impact of Wife’s Years of Education on Husband’s Education and Per Capita Household Income: Results of Second-stage 
Regression (2SLS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 BW3 BW4 BW5 BW6 
Panel A: Husband’s years of education 
Years of education 0.681*** 0.809*** 0.693*** 1.021*** 
 (0.151) (0.126) (0.187) (0.324) 
(Age - 30) -0.133* -0.065 -0.099 0.027 
 (0.071) (0.063) (0.069) (0.087) 
Constant -2.705 -2.645 -2.966* -4.030*** 
 (2.570) (2.298) (1.768) (1.531) 
Observations (no.) 418 519 660 853 
Mean of dep. var. in right of the cutoff 4.93 4.98 4.97 5.05 
Panel B: Per capita household income (100 Tk) 
Years of education 56.317*** 53.825*** 79.071* 84.030** 
 (21.451) (15.296) (43.824) (41.519) 
(Age - 30) 4.979 6.277 17.909 19.813 
 (5.899) (4.397) (14.169) (12.236) 
Constant 11.909 28.122 -3.155 -86.550 
 (146.088) (130.815) (104.506) (86.103) 
Observations (no.) 418 519 660 853 
Mean of dep. var. in right of the cutoff 288.61 306.64 304.31 325.71 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at cohort level, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.Number of working age 
members (15<age<60) within a household is controlled in panels B-D. Husband’s age is included in panels A-D. 
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Table 3.7 The Impact of Wife’s Years of Education on Husband’s Migration, Electrification, and Assortative Mating: Results of Second-stage 
Regression (2SLS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 BW3 BW4 BW5 BW6 
Panel A: Per capita household farm income (100Tk) 
Years of education 3.965 15.426 12.669 14.623 
 (13.590) (10.495) (17.790) (20.432) 
(Age - 30) -2.694 2.590 0.594 2.740 
 (6.891) (3.726) (5.945) (5.716) 
Constant -35.908 -93.365 -93.419 -55.324 
 (95.091) (100.626) (71.361) (67.884) 
Observations (no.) 418 519 660 853 
Mean of dep. var. in right of the cutoff 109.88 120.75 124.33 127.63 
Panel B: Per capita household non-farm income (100Tk) 
Years of education 52.352*** 38.399** 66.402 69.406* 
 (19.037) (19.269) (43.497) (37.976) 
(Age - 30) 7.673 3.687 17.315 17.073 
 (5.611) (4.621) (13.689) (10.912) 
Constant 47.817 121.486 90.264 -31.226 
 (132.616) (121.020) (122.698) (97.272) 
Observations (no.) 418 519 660 853 
Mean of dep. var. in right of the cutoff 178.73 185.89 179.99 198.08 
Panel C: 1 = if husband is a foreign migrant 
Years of education 0.061 0.058* 0.047 0.055 
 (0.048) (0.033) (0.035) (0.041) 
(Age - 30) 0.018 0.019 0.012 0.018 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.011) (0.012) 
Constant 0.298* 0.367*** 0.311*** 0.302** 
 (0.164) (0.120) (0.116) (0.117) 
Observations (no.) 449 565 715 922 
Mean of dep. var. in right of the cutoff 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at cohort level, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. % of non-farm village labor 
force and number of working age members (15<age<60) within a household are included in Panel A. Husband’s age is included in panels A-B. 
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Table 3.8 The Impact of Wife’s Years of Education on Fertility, Children’s Schooling, Sanitation Control, and Children’s Health: Results of 
Second-stage Regression (2SLS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 BW3 BW4 BW5 BW6 
Panel A: Number of births by wife’s age 23 (Fertility by wife’s age 23) 
Years of education -0.029 -0.043 0.049 0.057 
 (0.064) (0.050) (0.076) (0.055) 
(Age - 30) -0.022 -0.035** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.023) (0.017) (0.025) (0.027) 
Constant 1.978*** 1.896*** 1.426*** 1.182** 
 (0.443) (0.410) (0.385) (0.527) 
Observations (no.) 455 573 724 933 
Mean of dep. var. in right of the cutoff 1.38 1.40 1.41 1.39 
Panel B: 1 = if any family member aged between 15 and 22 is in schooling 
Years of education 0.010 0.051** -0.012 0.030 
 (0.033) (0.021) (0.031) (0.046) 
(Age - 30) 0.004 0.076** 0.021 0.039* 
 (0.044) (0.031) (0.034) (0.020) 
Constant -1.285*** -0.825 -0.442 -0.742*** 
 (0.445) (0.513) (0.433) (0.158) 
Observations (no.) 71 108 147 282 
Mean of dep. var. in right of the cutoff 0.57 0.67 0.69 0.67 
Panel C: 1 = if using latrine with water seal 
Years of education 0.109*** 0.161*** 0.101** 0.097 
 (0.021) (0.040) (0.050) (0.062) 
(Age - 30) 0.012 0.041* 0.019 0.020 
 (0.017) (0.021) (0.012) (0.013) 
Constant -0.025 -0.228 -0.004 -0.017 
 (0.155) (0.251) (0.276) (0.263) 
Observations (no.) 455 573 724 933 
Mean of dep. var. in right of the cutoff 0.51 0.57 0.56 0.56 
Panel D: if child aged between 0 and 5 is healthy 
Years of education 0.106* 0.058 0.139** 0.089** 
 (0.063) (0.047) (0.066) (0.043) 
(Age - 30) 0.017 0.014 0.038* 0.017* 
 (0.032) (0.026) (0.023) (0.010) 
Constant 0.150 0.707*** 0.481 0.712*** 
 (0.508) (0.225) (0.383) (0.254) 
Observations (no.) 294 347 465 583 
Mean of dep. var. in right of the cutoff 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.91 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at cohort level, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Number of siblings aged 0-5 
and number of siblings aged 6-18 are included in Panel B. Husband’s age is included in panels A, B, and D. Age dummies of children are 
included in panels B and D. 
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Table 3.9 The Impact of Wife’s Years of Education on Weekly Expenditure: Results of Second-stage Regression (2SLS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 BW3 BW4 BW5 BW6 
Panel A: Weekly total expenditure 
Years of education 232.470*** 765.663** 533.609* 437.918 
 (86.656) (319.580) (300.313) (325.089) 
(Age - 30) -38.832** 208.005* 54.769 57.412 
 (17.426) (123.587) (127.132) (98.262) 
Constant -1.4e+03** -4.3e+03*** -4.5e+03*** -3.6e+03*** 
 (560.254) (1661.025) (1273.482) (1084.494) 
Observations (no.) 455 573 724 933 
Mean of dep. var. in right of the cutoff 2999.03 3204.05 3177.43 3360.01 
Panel B: Weekly expenditure on nutritious food items 
Years of education 85.584*** 128.627*** 121.786*** 118.701*** 
 (23.421) (42.856) (29.367) (34.738) 
(Age - 30) 18.640** 33.741** 28.454*** 17.879* 
 (8.733) (13.115) (8.087) (10.815) 
Constant 113.215 -245.926 -204.190 -487.872** 
 (252.555) (353.627) (242.468) (202.297) 
Observations (no.) 455 573 724 933 
Mean of dep. var. in right of the cutoff 655.03 687.62 679.99 706.88 
Panel C: Weekly expenditure on sanitation items 
Years of education 5.878*** 6.954*** 6.944*** 5.319 
 (1.565) (1.597) (2.554) (3.979) 
(Age - 30) 1.949** 2.146*** 1.898** 1.172 
 (0.867) (0.515) (0.740) (1.155) 
Constant -17.274 -25.393** -23.703* -22.822* 
 (13.838) (12.425) (12.654) (13.080) 
Observations (no.) 455 573 724 933 
Mean of dep. var. in right of the cutoff 60.03 61.87 62.10 64.59 
Panel D: Weekly expenditure on medical care 
Years of education 77.948** 139.460** 102.081 49.688 
 (36.975) (67.825) (93.782) (79.094) 
(Age - 30) 11.298 34.174* 9.771 5.072 
 (15.525) (19.916) (36.096) (22.484) 
Constant -568.171** -1.2e+03** -1.0e+03** -590.630 
 (281.199) (536.616) (407.368) (393.118) 
Observations (no.) 455 573 724 933 
Mean of dep. var. in right of the cutoff 155.01 184.79 193.12 212.85 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at cohort level, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The number of family 
members in a household and husband’s age are included in panels A-D. 
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics of Selected Variables: Sample Women Aged 25-60 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 2000 2008 2014 
Individual characteristics    
Age of the member 38.65 39.24 39.32 
Years of education 2.57 3.77 4.68 
1 = None or illiterate 0.54 0.44 0.34 
1 = Primary 0.28 0.26 0.28 
1 = Low secondary 0.10 0.14 0.17 
1 = High secondary and above 0.08 0.16 0.21 
1 = Married 0.87 0.90 0.90 
1 = Widow/ Separated/ Divorced 0.12 0.10 0.09 
1 = FLFP using occupational data 0.06 0.08 0.09 
1 = FLFP using time allocation data 0.64 0.73 0.67 
Household characteristics    
Head’s years of education 3.91 4.04 4.68 
Head: 1 = None or illiterate 0.43 0.45 0.37 
Head: 1 = Primary 0.28 0.23 0.27 
Head: 1 = Low secondary 0.10 0.13 0.13 
Head: 1 = High secondary and above 0.20 0.19 0.23 
Head: 1 = Farming 0.53 0.52 0.49 
Head: 1 = Non-farming 0.37 0.30 0.33 
Number of children aged 0-4 0.40 0.25 0.24 
Number of working age male members (15<age<61) 1.48 1.93 1.70 
1 = if living with parent(s) 0.19 0.15 0.16 
Household per capita income (Tk.) 21674.47 23458.69 27165.30 
Proportion of Non-agricultural income 46.39 48.65 61.61 
Log of non-land assets 5.84 6.84 8.65 
Owned land of hh (ha) 0.56 0.49 0.42 
1= if Muslim 0.91 0.88 0.92 
Access to electricity 0.47 0.83 0.73 
Travel distance to upazila HQ 6.07 7.20 8.72 
Observations 1768 1265 2370 
Note: Nominal values are adjusted at 2010 level by using CPI from World Development Indicators (WDI) 
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Table 4.2 Summary Statistics of Work, Time Allocation, and Total Income for the Last Four Days: Sample Women Aged 25-60 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 2000 2008 2014 
1 = if paid or unpaid work 0.64 0.73 0.67 
1 = if unpaid work  0.60 0.68 0.62 
1 = if time spent on unpaid farm work 0.58 0.65 0.60 
1 = if time spent on unpaid non-farm work 0.07 0.07 0.09 
1 = if paid work 0.04 0.05 0.05 
1 = if time spent on paid farm work 0.01 0.02 0.01 
1 = if time spent on paid non-farm work 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Total income (Tk.) 12.33 15.74 18.96 
Total hours 45.04 39.71 41.49 
Total hours of paid or unpaid work conditional on participation 9.60 9.90 9.96 
Total hours of unpaid work conditional on participation 8.63 8.59 8.74 
Time on unpaid farm work 7.47 7.75 8.09 
Time on unpaid non-farm work 14.76 13.56 8.39 
Total hours of paid work conditional on participation 23.60 24.24 21.28 
Time on paid farm work 25.00 17.57 21.76 
Time on paid non-farm work 24.23 26.00 21.24 
Total hours of non-productive work 15.79 10.86 12.08 
Total hours of housework/childcare 25.99 25.82 24.99 
Observations 1768 1265 2370 
Note: Nominal values are adjusted at 2010 level by using CPI from WDI 
Income data is available only for employed work 
Non-productive activities include rest, entertainment, recreation, taking meal, and so on. 
Paid or unpaid work includes any productive activity such as agricultural, manufacturing, and service work regardless of whether it is associated 
with income or not 
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Table 4.3 Summary Statistics of Work, Time Allocation, and Total Income for the Last Four Days by Education Group: Sample Women Aged 
25-60 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: 2000 
 Illiterate Primary Low Secondary High Secondary 
and above 
1 = if paid or unpaid work 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.57 
1 = if unpaid work  0.61 0.63 0.60 0.47 
1 = if time spent on unpaid farm work 0.59 0.60 0.58 0.45 
1 = if time spent on unpaid non-farm work 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.09 
1 = if paid work 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.10 
1 = if time spent on paid farm work 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 = if time spent on paid non-farm work 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.10 
Total income (Tk.) 7.89 1.79 10.32 84.53 
Total hours 45.11 44.82 45.30 44.97 
Total hours of paid or unpaid work 9.77 8.73 8.46 13.42 
Total hours of unpaid work 8.78 8.37 7.78 9.88 
Time on unpaid farm work 7.58 7.45 6.72 7.74 
Time on unpaid non-farm work 14.52 14.96 15.50 15.00 
Total hours of paid work 23.15 24.33 16.43 28.21 
Time on paid farm work 26.15 17.50 n/a n/a 
Time on paid non-farm work 22.88 27.75 18.00 28.21 
Hourly earnings of each individual 8.55 5.19 14.24 29.93 
Hourly earnings of farm work 7.08 3.23 n/a n/a 
Hourly earnings of non-farm work 9.68 6.17 16.49 29.93 
Observations 965 492 175 136 
Panel B: 2014 
 Illiterate Primary Low Secondary High Secondary 
and above 
1 = if paid or unpaid work 0.72 0.68 0.65 0.55 
1 = if unpaid work  0.66 0.65 0.60 0.47 
1 = if time spent on unpaid farm work 0.64 0.62 0.59 0.46 
1 = if time spent on unpaid non-farm work 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08 
1 = if paid work 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.09 
1 = if time spent on paid farm work 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 
1 = if time spent on paid non-farm work 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.08 
Total income (Tk.) 15.44 7.06 11.62 55.28 
Total hours 41.65 41.02 41.62 41.85 
Total hours of paid or unpaid work 10.88 9.06 9.23 10.09 
Total hours of unpaid work 9.41 8.55 8.55 7.35 
Time on unpaid farm work 8.61 8.04 8.03 6.66 
Time on unpaid non-farm work 9.31 8.03 7.84 7.11 
Total hours of paid work 24.08 19.37 12.68 23.21 
Time on paid farm work 22.02 22.00 n/a 18.00 
Time on paid non-farm work 25.79 18.15 12.68 24.25 
Hourly earnings of each individual 11.43 16.47 21.81 25.30 
Hourly earnings of farm work 12.02 15.23 n/a 10.99 
Hourly earnings of non-farm work 10.74 17.52 21.81 27.01 
Observations 877 682 418 393 
Note: Nominal values are adjusted at 2010 level by using CPI from WDI 
Income and wage data is available only for paid work 
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Table 4.4 Distribution of Top 5 Farm Work for the Last Four Days: Sample Women Aged 25-60 in 2000 and 2014 
Panel A: Paid work in 2000 
All women 
(N = 1214) 
Women with low education 
(N = 1028) 
Women with high education 
(N = 186) 
 %  %  % 
Poultry rearing 66.9 Poultry rearing 65.5 Poultry rearing 74.7 
Livestock rearing 27.6 Livestock rearing 28.8 Livestock rearing 21.0 
Post-harvest activity 3.0 Post-harvest activity 3.0 Post-harvest activity 2.7 
Agricultural work 1.8 Agricultural work 2.0 Planting tree 1.1 
Fishing 0.3 Fishing 0.4 Agricultural work 0.5 
Panel B: Paid work in 2014 
All women 
(N = 1839) 
Women with low education 
(N = 1300) 
Women with high education 
(N = 539) 
 %  %  % 
Livestock rearing 51.1 Livestock rearing 52.2 Livestock rearing 48.6 
Poultry rearing 33.6 Poultry rearing 31.8 Poultry rearing 37.8 
Post-harvest activity 9.6 Post-harvest activity 9.8 Post-harvest activity 8.9 
Agriculture work  3.2 Agriculture work  3.3 Agriculture work  2.8 
Day laborer 1.6 Day laborer 2.2 Fishing/Fish culture 0.9 
Note: Women with low education = those who have primary or below education 
Women with high education = those who have secondary or above education 
N is the total number of reported activities by sample women 
Women are engaged in more than one activity in a day 
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Table 4.5 Distribution of Top 5 Non-farm Work for the Last Four Days: Sample Women Aged 25-60 in 2000 and 2014 
Panel A: Unpaid work in 2000 
All women 
(N = 173) 
Women with low education 
(N = 128) 
Women with high education 
(N = 45) 
 %  %  % 
NGO work 15.0 Nursing 17.2 Service 51.1 
Service 14.5 Cottage industry 15.6 NGO work 13.3 
Nursing 13.9 NGO work 15.6 Social work 8.9 
Cottage industry 12.1 Social work 8.6 Nursing 4.4 
Social work 8.7 Business 3.9 Business 4.4 
Panel B: Unpaid work in 2014 
All women 
(N = 306) 
Women with low education 
(N = 183) 
Women with high education 
(N = 123) 
 %  %  % 
Business 18.6 Business 23.0 Service 23.6 
Nursing 14.1 Social work 15.3 Nursing 17.1 
Social work 13.1 Cottage Industries 13.1 Tailoring 16.3 
Service 12.4 Nursing 12.0 Business 12.2 
Cottage Industries 9.5 Maid servant 8.7 Social work 9.8 
Note: Women with low education = those who have primary or below education 
Women with high education = those who have secondary or above education 
N is the total number of reported activities by sample women 
Women are engaged in more than one activity in a day 
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Table 4.6 Factors Associated with the Characteristics of Women Engaged in Work in 2000-2014 (Probit) 
Dependent variable: Dummy variable for women who are engaged in farm, non-farm, paid, or unpaid work for the last four days 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Farm work Non-farm work Unpaid work Paid work 
 2000 2008 2014 2000 2008 2014 2000 2008 2014 2000 2008 2014 
Age of the member 0.023** 0.063*** 0.035*** 0.024*** 0.019* 0.005 0.033*** 0.061*** 0.021* 0.006* 0.012* 0.015*** 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) 
Age square -0.000** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000 -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Primary -0.027 0.007 -0.041 0.007 0.039 -0.011 -0.031 0.071* -0.022 0.001 -0.035*** -0.007 
 (0.038) (0.036) (0.037) (0.017) (0.024) (0.018) (0.038) (0.037) (0.034) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) 
Low secondary -0.030 0.014 -0.052 0.074** 0.023 0.003 -0.028 0.035 -0.050 0.060*** -0.004 0.002 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.037) (0.026) (0.026) (0.044) (0.044) (0.039) (0.021) (0.019) (0.012) 
High secondary and above -0.155** -0.073 -0.099** 0.250*** 0.100** 0.046 -0.121* -0.062 -0.106** 0.143*** 0.082* 0.056*** 
 (0.070) (0.063) (0.047) (0.067) (0.048) (0.036) (0.072) (0.069) (0.045) (0.052) (0.044) (0.021) 
Widow/Separated/Divorced -0.233*** 0.026 -0.019 -0.012 0.057 0.047 -0.212*** -0.016 -0.069 0.052 0.080 0.116** 
 (0.065) (0.078) (0.056) (0.033) (0.065) (0.043) (0.071) (0.091) (0.058) (0.035) (0.062) (0.048) 
Head’s education: Primary 0.044 0.009 0.072** -0.013 -0.039 -0.002 0.039 -0.001 0.067** 0.013 -0.027** -0.021* 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.018) (0.027) (0.017) (0.029) (0.033) (0.031) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) 
Head’s education: Low secondary 0.012 -0.027 0.036 -0.022 -0.033 -0.014 0.013 -0.076 0.004 -0.020** 0.003 0.010 
 (0.055) (0.045) (0.039) (0.032) (0.027) (0.021) (0.048) (0.047) (0.037) (0.010) (0.023) (0.017) 
Head’s education: High secondary 
and above 
0.024 -0.022 -0.011 -0.034 -0.018 0.007 0.008 -0.038 -0.029 -0.006 -0.018 -0.003 
 (0.052) (0.047) (0.039) (0.025) (0.032) (0.025) (0.052) (0.050) (0.036) (0.013) (0.018) (0.014) 
Head’s occupation: Non-farm -0.048* -0.067** -0.104*** 0.010 0.040** 0.005 -0.038 -0.034 -0.101*** -0.002 0.008 0.008 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020) (0.028) (0.031) (0.026) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) 
Head’s occupation: Unemployed -0.084 -0.231*** -0.205*** 0.056* 0.126** 0.060* -0.062 -0.146** -0.188*** -0.010 0.061* 0.032 
 (0.060) (0.056) (0.049) (0.032) (0.051) (0.031) (0.055) (0.059) (0.054) (0.015) (0.032) (0.023) 
Number of children aged 0-4 -0.037* -0.031 -0.016 -0.012 0.003 -0.001 -0.020 -0.035 -0.017 -0.011* -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.020) (0.030) (0.026) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.026) (0.029) (0.007) (0.013) (0.010) 
Number of working age male 
members (15<age<61) 
-0.013 -0.007 0.011 0.001 -0.023*** -0.010 0.007 -0.000 0.005 -0.014* -0.026*** -0.003 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) 
1 = if living with parent(s) 0.023 -0.002 0.008 0.015 0.063*** 0.016 -0.014 0.012 0.020 0.012 0.029* 0.001 
 (0.030) (0.038) (0.031) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.033) (0.036) (0.032) (0.007) (0.015) (0.013) 
Log of non-land assets 0.007* 0.013** 0.005 -0.002 0.003 -0.007 0.007* 0.012** 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Owned land of hh (ha) -0.023 0.038 0.007 -0.031** -0.007 -0.028* -0.034* 0.031 0.012 -0.006 -0.009 -0.018** 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.017) (0.014) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.021) (0.017) (0.005) (0.013) (0.009) 
1= if Muslim 0.136** -0.115** -0.026 -0.054** 0.011 0.012 0.123* -0.021 0.034 -0.039*** -0.023 -0.028** 
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 (0.061) (0.049) (0.043) (0.024) (0.040) (0.023) (0.063) (0.045) (0.045) (0.014) (0.024) (0.011) 
Access to electricity -0.050 -0.028 -0.025 0.007 0.014 0.013 -0.028 0.007 0.012 -0.000 -0.004 -0.016* 
 (0.054) (0.069) (0.029) (0.017) (0.020) (0.024) (0.044) (0.055) (0.025) (0.009) (0.022) (0.009) 
Average hours of women's paid 
work in village 
0.006 0.012 -0.003 -0.001 0.010 0.021** -0.008 -0.002 -0.026 0.008** 0.009 0.017*** 
 (0.022) (0.017) (0.021) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) 
Average hours of women's unpaid 
work in village 
0.031** 0.037*** 0.052*** 0.017*** 0.009*** 0.006 0.039*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.003* -0.003 0.004* 
 (0.014) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Travel distance to upazila HQ 0.070 -0.040 0.049 0.053** 0.029* -0.004 0.063 0.018 0.023 0.005 -0.011 0.017** 
 (0.090) (0.038) (0.035) (0.027) (0.015) (0.022) (0.078) (0.030) (0.031) (0.012) (0.015) (0.008) 
Season: Normal -0.124*** -0.002 -0.034 0.024 0.019 0.052*** -0.121*** -0.015 -0.033 0.004 0.010 0.011 
 (0.038) (0.031) (0.037) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.036) (0.032) (0.033) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) 
Season: Lean -0.136** -0.084 -0.012 0.021 -0.016 0.082*** -0.113** -0.117 -0.003 -0.009 0.029 0.008 
 (0.053) (0.098) (0.043) (0.023) (0.058) (0.032) (0.050) (0.100) (0.042) (0.012) (0.058) (0.012) 
Observations 1384 1120 1949 1384 1120 1949 1384 1120 1949 1384 1120 1949 
Note: Base education = Illiterate 
Base marital status = Married 
Base head’s occupation = Farming 
Base season: Busy 
State dummies are included 
Seasonal dummies are included 
Nominal values are adjusted at 2010 level by using CPI from WDI 
Standard errors clustered at village level 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Reporting marginal effects 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4.7 Factors Associated with Time on Different Work in 2000-2014 (Truncated) 
Dependent variable: Total hours of each work for the last four days, conditional on participation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Farm work Non-farm work Unpaid work Paid work 
 2000 2008 2014 2000 2008 2014 2000 2008 2014 2000 2008 2014 
Age of the member 0.615*** 0.564 0.342 -3.558 2.042 0.773 0.867** 0.964** -0.055 0.531 -1.452** -2.638** 
 (0.205) (0.350) (0.381) (2.234) (1.572) (1.449) (0.376) (0.448) (0.320) (1.028) (0.659) (1.331) 
Age square -0.007*** -0.006 -0.004 0.045* -0.025 -0.014 -0.010** -0.011* 0.001 -0.014 0.018** 0.032* 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.027) (0.019) (0.018) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.011) (0.008) (0.018) 
Primary -0.757 0.395 0.182 -0.503 -15.041*** -3.385 -0.490 1.820* 0.142 0.411 -4.980 -5.604 
 (0.670) (0.699) (0.770) (6.224) (5.505) (6.724) (1.298) (1.083) (0.745) (3.270) (6.037) (4.320) 
Low secondary -2.525*** 0.596 0.615 4.818 -1.855 -8.856 -1.903 2.412 0.209 -6.363 -9.798*** -19.195*** 
 (0.941) (1.261) (1.006) (7.083) (7.694) (7.549) (2.500) (1.983) (0.891) (4.332) (2.992) (6.597) 
High secondary and above -0.495 -2.877* 1.108 17.913*** 6.997 5.608 2.392 1.630 0.397 4.225 3.211 -8.373 
 (2.100) (1.596) (1.384) (6.497) (5.543) (6.619) (2.927) (2.624) (1.245) (5.149) (3.857) (7.092) 
Widow/Separated/Divorced 0.083 1.311 1.620 17.172* 7.896* 13.488** -2.651 2.140 1.417 1.474 6.662** 4.562 
 (1.850) (2.495) (2.005) (9.531) (4.697) (6.334) (3.359) (2.537) (1.678) (4.883) (2.993) (4.447) 
Head’s education: Primary 0.229 -0.305 -0.681 0.051 -5.648 -4.635 -1.588 -0.121 -0.206 3.853** -3.986 2.657 
 (0.476) (0.791) (0.618) (4.858) (5.267) (6.296) (1.226) (1.317) (0.478) (1.631) (2.636) (3.847) 
Head’s education: Low secondary -0.786 -1.186 -2.699*** -1.215 18.440** 6.307 -2.014 0.173 -1.621* 11.804* -2.643 5.703** 
 (0.828) (1.241) (0.971) (7.811) (7.584) (6.490) (1.837) (2.085) (0.900) (6.358) (5.486) (2.865) 
Head’s education: High secondary 
and above 
1.542 -1.219 -2.688*** -0.902 -3.114 5.502 1.315 -1.701 -1.671** 0.999 8.346* 13.368*** 
 (0.986) (1.304) (0.801) (6.425) (4.884) (6.550) (2.042) (1.971) (0.807) (3.651) (4.313) (5.041) 
Head’s occupation: Non-farm -1.263* -1.298 -1.509** -1.265 -3.897 4.278 -1.663 -2.204* -1.103** 7.169** 8.514*** 0.094 
 (0.650) (0.879) (0.727) (4.924) (3.442) (4.557) (1.258) (1.221) (0.524) (2.830) (1.784) (2.881) 
Head’s occupation: Unemployed -1.741 2.460 -3.087** 0.839 -0.619 12.101** 0.541 2.093 -0.586 23.506*** 6.196* 0.201 
 (1.385) (1.614) (1.561) (6.605) (4.440) (5.831) (2.139) (2.533) (1.274) (5.411) (3.438) (5.792) 
Number of children aged 0-4 -2.001*** -1.572** -1.291 -3.347 -1.051 -2.284 -3.451*** -0.948 -0.836 -9.333* 5.742*** -5.377* 
 (0.504) (0.662) (0.825) (4.601) (3.724) (3.708) (1.040) (1.213) (0.669) (5.106) (2.194) (2.932) 
Number of working age male 
members (15<age<61) 
-0.373 -0.695* 0.342 -0.169 -1.298 -2.254 0.157 -0.573 0.150 -2.438** 0.005 -2.609 
 (0.328) (0.385) (0.282) (3.210) (1.336) (1.836) (0.722) (0.470) (0.243) (0.948) (1.103) (1.761) 
1 = if living with parent(s) 1.158* 0.616 1.572** -2.273 -4.394 4.140 1.720 0.449 1.360** 4.414 1.602 3.582 
 (0.648) (0.891) (0.798) (5.197) (4.097) (4.024) (1.297) (1.266) (0.671) (3.953) (3.560) (2.933) 
Log of non-land assets -0.117 0.034 0.110 -0.144 -1.848*** 0.333 -0.380 0.322 -0.021 1.179*** -1.752*** -0.367 
 (0.104) (0.156) (0.257) (0.814) (0.712) (1.433) (0.238) (0.220) (0.197) (0.336) (0.594) (1.240) 
Owned land of hh (ha) 0.144 0.112 -1.212* -0.593 3.207** 2.427 -0.169 0.202 -0.903* -5.178*** -0.338 -1.305 
 (0.366) (0.435) (0.629) (2.977) (1.383) (2.484) (0.758) (0.691) (0.506) (1.373) (1.253) (1.658) 
1= if Muslim -2.412** -2.427 -2.125 -8.776 -7.215 -0.747 -4.677* -0.229 -0.362 -0.378 -7.751** 3.114 
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 (1.129) (1.636) (1.364) (7.423) (7.560) (5.425) (2.532) (1.772) (1.129) (1.530) (3.530) (3.951) 
Access to electricity 0.072 -1.505 -0.515 -0.210 -5.111 -4.665 0.961 -1.449 -0.385 10.990*** 9.767*** 6.054* 
 (0.655) (0.965) (0.665) (4.571) (5.362) (3.462) (1.346) (1.657) (0.518) (3.832) (2.421) (3.329) 
Average hours of women's paid 
work in village 
1.493*** 0.509 0.067 -0.208 -6.402*** 0.132 1.691*** -0.362 -0.100 3.221** -0.649 0.916 
 (0.318) (0.396) (0.324) (2.457) (2.213) (1.706) (0.641) (0.609) (0.324) (1.421) (1.544) (1.118) 
Average hours of women's unpaid 
work in village 
0.029 0.676*** 1.398*** 0.935 -0.367 0.541 0.812* 1.338*** 1.217*** 0.614 -0.278 -0.368 
 (0.172) (0.202) (0.255) (0.814) (0.706) (0.712) (0.447) (0.312) (0.218) (0.767) (0.487) (0.566) 
Travel distance to upazila HQ -0.012 -0.485 0.471 -15.489 3.415 0.604 0.266 -0.547 -0.529 4.838 0.560 -2.720 
 (0.820) (0.807) (0.757) (10.457) (4.668) (4.083) (1.895) (1.048) (0.668) (3.994) (3.695) (3.627) 
Season: Normal -0.415 -0.363 -4.052*** -3.269 -2.096 -8.923* 0.629 0.585 -3.461*** -6.477** -9.071*** -0.482 
 (0.819) (0.908) (0.956) (5.320) (3.360) (4.971) (1.394) (1.247) (0.881) (2.525) (3.121) (3.467) 
Season: Lean 0.292 -3.494 -4.411*** 6.986 20.831** -7.767* 2.844 -5.417 -2.926*** -0.992 -4.271 -1.448 
 (1.029) (2.931) (1.061) (5.951) (9.884) (4.662) (2.092) (4.225) (0.870) (4.768) (7.883) (3.704) 
Observations 1384 1120 1949 1384 1120 1949 1384 1120 1949 1384 1120 1949 
Note: Base education = Illiterate 
Base marital status = Married 
Base head’s occupation = Farming 
Base season = Busy 
State dummies are included 
Seasonal dummies are included 
Nominal values are adjusted at 2010 level by using CPI from WDI 
Standard errors clustered at village level 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Reporting marginal effects 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table A3.1 The impact of the female secondary stipend program on husband’s years of education: results of first-stage regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 BW3 BW4 BW5 BW6 
Treatment = 1 0.420 0.555 -0.022 -0.020 
 (0.578) (0.531) (0.636) (0.534) 
Treat*(Age - 30) -0.262 -0.160 0.255 0.333* 
 (0.375) (0.181) (0.237) (0.168) 
(Age - 30) 0.098 0.169* -0.097 -0.167*** 
 (0.278) (0.075) (0.143) (0.049) 
Constant 3.107** 2.632** 2.724** 3.519*** 
 (1.121) (1.074) (0.968) (0.874) 
F statistics 0.34 2.81 0.59 2.91 
Observations (no.) 338 426 517 643 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at cohort level, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table A3.2 The impact of women’s years of schooling on FLFP: all women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 BW3 BW4 BW5 BW6 BW7 BW8 BW9 BW10 
Panel A: The impact of the stipend program on years of schooling: First-stage results 
Treatment = 1 1.116* 0.912* 1.056** 1.029** 1.125** 1.315*** 1.313*** 1.137*** 
 (0.513) (0.401) (0.390) (0.397) (0.408) (0.377) (0.366) (0.358) 
Treat*(Age - 30) -0.301 -0.311* -0.120 -0.024 0.015 -0.094 -0.058 -0.007 
 (0.248) (0.145) (0.095) (0.091) (0.088) (0.084) (0.074) (0.068) 
(Age - 30) 0.024 -0.098 -0.101 -0.153** -0.146** -0.066 -0.087 -0.137** 
 (0.280) (0.119) (0.079) (0.069) (0.066) (0.071) (0.065) (0.062) 
Constant 3.853* 4.607** 3.587** 3.437*** 3.485*** 3.342*** 3.493*** 3.736*** 
 (1.882) (1.731) (1.119) (0.848) (0.811) (0.630) (0.608) (0.609) 
Observations 
(no.) 
643 800 1048 1367 1531 1720 1898 2070 
Panel B: The impact of years of schooling on FLFP: Second-stage results 
Years of 
education 
-0.019 -0.013 -0.031 -0.036 -0.016 -0.022 -0.007 0.006 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.024) (0.028) (0.025) (0.020) (0.026) (0.027) 
(Age - 30) -0.004 -0.009* -0.009 -0.013 -0.006 -0.007 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age of head 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 0.086 0.026 0.039 0.011 -0.020 -0.031 -0.053 -0.057 
 (0.127) (0.124) (0.103) (0.086) (0.081) (0.071) (0.081) (0.087) 
Observations 
(no.) 
640 796 1044 1359 1522 1710 1886 2056 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at cohort level, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table A4.1 Summary Statistics of Work, Time Allocation, and Total Income for the Last Four Days: Sample Men Aged 25-60 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 2000 2008 2014 
1 = if paid or unpaid work 0.91 0.94 0.94 
1 = if unpaid work  0.58 0.52 0.54 
1 = if time spent on unpaid farm work 0.46 0.57 0.58 
1 = if time spent on unpaid non-farm work 0.33 0.23 0.27 
1 = if paid work 0.34 0.43 0.40 
1 = if time spent on paid farm work 0.13 0.16 0.16 
1 = if time spent on paid non-farm work 0.20 0.26 0.23 
Total income (Tk.) 175.25 245.33 320.75 
Total hours 46.85 43.45 43.91 
Total hours of paid or unpaid work 26.66 28.71 26.58 
Total hours of unpaid work 17.36 16.34 15.81 
Time on unpaid farm work 9.20 11.11 8.82 
Time on unpaid non-farm work 8.16 5.22 6.98 
Total hours of paid work 9.81 13.00 11.19 
Time on paid farm work 3.57 4.58 4.17 
Time on paid non-farm work 5.72 7.78 6.60 
Total hours of non-productive work 14.89 9.96 11.43 
Total hours of housework/childcare 5.30 4.78 5.91 
Observations 1656 1249 2186 
Note: Nominal values are adjusted at 2010 level by using CPI from WDI 
Income data is available only for paid work 
Non-productive activities include rest, entertainment, recreation, taking meal, and so on. 
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Appendix Table A4.2 Determinants of Women in Farm Occupation (Multinomial Probit) in 2000-2014 
Categorical variable: 1 = Farming, 2 = Non-farming, 3 = Not working (Base category) 
 (2) (3) (4) 
 2000 2008 2014 
Age of the member 0.006** -0.000 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Age square -0.000** 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Primary 0.003 -0.006 -0.017** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
Low secondary -0.007*** -0.014*** -0.021** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.008) 
High secondary and above -0.007*** 0.011 -0.013 
 (0.001) (0.019) (0.008) 
Widow/Separated/Divorced 0.054 -0.007 0.001 
 (0.042) (0.006) (0.017) 
Head’s education: Primary -0.007* 0.007 0.008 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) 
Head’s education: Low secondary -0.012*** 0.004 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.012) 
Head’s education: High secondary and above -0.012*** -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.008) 
Head’s occupation: Non-farm sector -0.005 -0.008 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Head’s occupation: Unemployed -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.016*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Number of children aged 0-4 -0.003 0.000 -0.015* 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) 
Number of working age male members (15<age<61) -0.005 -0.006 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.002) 
1 = if living with parent(s) -0.083*** 0.010* -0.008 
 (0.027) (0.006) (0.008) 
Log of non-land asset 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Owned land of hh (ha) -0.012 -0.017** -0.008 
 (0.014) (0.009) (0.006) 
1= if Muslim -0.009 -0.014** -0.013*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Access to electricity -0.004 -0.011* 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
% of non-farm MALE village labor force 0.002 0.001 -0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
% of farm FEMALE village labor force 0.010*** 0.008 0.007 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) 
% of non-farm FEMALE village labor force -0.008 -0.007 0.004 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) 
Travel distance to upazila HQ 0.002 0.006 0.011 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) 
Observations 1459 1770 2252 
Note: Base marital status = Married 
Base education status = Illiterate 
Base occupation = Farm sector 
State dummies are included 
Nominal values are adjusted at 2010 level by using CPI from WDI 
Standard errors clustered at village level 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Reporting marginal effects 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table A4.3 Determinants of Women in Non-farm Occupation (Multinomial Probit) in 2000-2014 
Categorical variable: 1 = Farming, 2 = Non-farming, 3 = Not working (Base category) 
 (2) (3) (4) 
 2000 2008 2014 
Age of the member 0.008 0.012** 0.014*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Age square -0.000 -0.000** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Primary -0.008 -0.012 0.000 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) 
Low secondary 0.055** -0.015 0.001 
 (0.027) (0.014) (0.018) 
High secondary and above 0.190*** 0.080** 0.046* 
 (0.048) (0.036) (0.026) 
Widow/Separated/Divorced 0.043 0.104** 0.169*** 
 (0.033) (0.050) (0.060) 
Head’s education: Primary -0.007 -0.020 -0.017 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) 
Head’s education: Low secondary -0.008 0.012 0.009 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) 
Head’s education: High secondary and above 0.002 0.004 -0.000 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.015) 
Head’s occupation: Non-farm sector 0.013 0.026** 0.023 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) 
Head’s occupation: Unemployed 0.028 0.073*** 0.010 
 (0.023) (0.028) (0.019) 
Number of children aged 0-4 -0.017** -0.003 0.005 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) 
Number of working age male members (15<age<61) -0.019** -0.008 -0.006 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) 
1 = if living with parent(s) -0.004 0.013 -0.016 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) 
Log of non-land asset 0.001 0.002 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Owned land of hh (ha) -0.018 -0.007 -0.004 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.006) 
1= if Muslim -0.009 -0.010 -0.018 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) 
Access to electricity -0.009 -0.012 0.013 
 (0.009) (0.020) (0.011) 
% of non-farm MALE village labor force -0.007** -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
% of farm FEMALE village labor force 0.007 -0.023 0.027* 
 (0.013) (0.021) (0.015) 
% of non-farm FEMALE village labor force 0.031*** 0.016 0.034 
 (0.003) (0.013) (0.026) 
Travel distance to upazila HQ -0.005 -0.012 -0.006 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.016) 
Observations 1459 1770 2252 
Note: Base marital status = Married 
Base education status = Illiterate 
Base occupation = Farm sector 
State dummies are included 
Nominal values are adjusted at 2010 level by using CPI from WDI 
Standard errors clustered at village level 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Reporting marginal effects 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Figures 
Figure 2.1 Map of Survey Sample Villages 
 
Source: Minhaj Mahmud 
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Figure 3.1 School enrollment rate, by gender and age, in 1988, 2000, and 2014 
  
Source: Livelihood System of Rural Households Panel Data in 1988 and 2000 
Note: X axis shows age; Y axis shows school enrollment rate 
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Figure 3.2 Years of schooling, by gender and age, in 1988, 2000, and 2014 
  
Source: Livelihood System of Rural Households Panel Data in 1988, 2000, and 2014 
Note: X axis shows age group; Y axis shows years of schooling 
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Figure 3.3 Average and scatter plots of years of education, by age  
(a) Average years of education: Wife (b) Average years of education: Husband 
  
(c) Scatter plots of years of education: Wife (d) Scatter plots of years of education: Husband 
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Figure 3.4 Estimation framework 
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Figure 3.5 Density check in forcing variable: McCrary (2008) density test and discontinuity check in grade repetition and delayed entry 
(a) McCrary (2008) density test with data in 2000 (b) McCrary (2008) density test with data in 2014 
  
(c) Discontinuity chck in grade repetition and delayed entry in 2000 
 
Note: X axis shows age. Vertical lines indicate the cutoff at ages 16 and 30 in 2000 and 2014, respectively. 
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Figure 3.6 Discontinuity check in other covariates: pre-marital household characteristics in 2000 
(a) Mother’s years of schooling (b) Father’s years of schooling 
  
(c) Amount of owned land (ha) (d) Log of non-land fixed asset 
  
Note: Vertical lines indicate the cutoff at age 16. 
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Figure 4.1 Long-term Change in Income Per Capita and Its Composition in Bangladesh in 1973-2015 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicator (WDI), World Bank 
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Figure 4.2 Relationship between Women’s Probability/Time Spending on Each Work and Years of Schooling: Sample Women Aged 25-60 in 2000-2014 
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Figure 4.3 Relationship between Women’s Probability/Time Spending on Each Work and Years of Schooling: Sample Women Aged 25-60 in 2000-2014 
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Appendix Figure A3.1 Bandwidth selection: Cross-validation function 
 
Note: X axis shows the bandwidth.  
 
 
18
18.5
19
19.5
20
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
139 
 
Appendix Figure A3.2 Discontinuity check in grade repetition and delayed entry 
(a) Data in 2008 (b) Data in 2014 
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Appendix Figure A3.3 Probability of attrition using the data in 2000 
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Annexes 
Annex 1. Description of employment provision of active earning members of family during last four days. 
Considering employment opportunities, the current week was:  1= Busy time, 2= Normal time, 3= Lean/slump time 
Name of earnings 
members 
Sl. No. 
of 
member 
Activity 
Yesterday 
(Day1 ) 
----- day 
Day before yesterday 
(Day 2)  
----- day 
Day before that 
(Day 3) ----- day 
Day before that 
(Day 4) 
----- day 
Maximum 4 
activities of 
every member 
Code 
Time 
(Hours) 
 Wages/ 
income 
(Tk.) 
Time 
(Hours) 
Wages/income 
(Tk.) 
Time 
(Hours) 
Wages/ 
income 
(Tk.) 
Time 
(Hours) 
Wages/ 
income 
(Tk.) 
1 2 3 4 5 6* 7 8* 9 10* 11 12* 
Name : 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Name : 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Name : 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Code (Column-4) Activities/works : 1=Agriculture work (in Field), 2= Post-harvest work (at home), 3=Fishing/Fish culture, 4=Selling of fish, 
5=Fish processing, 6=Cottage Industries, 7=Rickshaw/ Van pulling, 8=Plying boat / pulling trolly/cart, 9=Domestic works, 10= Collection of fire 
wood, 11=Repairing/ building house, 12=Nursing of patient, 13=Recreation,14=Rest, 15=Social work, 16=Visit outside the district, 17= Earthwork, 
18=Tailoring, 19=Tree plantation, 20=Chopping  tree, 21=Taking care of children, 22=Looking after cattle, 23=Poultry rearing, 24=Shopping / 
marketing, 25=Giving lessons to children, 26=Attending NGO/society meeting, 27=Engaged in business, 28=Engaged in service/job, 29=Engaged 
as industrial labor, 30=Begging, 31=Studying, 32=House tutor, 33=Day laborer 
* If not self-employed, mention wages/income (Tk.)
